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ABSTRACT 
2020, the year of the unprecedented SolarWinds hack, saw state-
sponsored cyber-agents taking near-war tensions between the U.S. 
and Iran to a computer near you; inevitably, cyber-criminals are 
likely to exploit the ensuing chaos to hack, steal, and ransom with 
impunity.  As it stands, the dominant cyberlaw paradigm as 
expressed in the 2017 NATO-led Tallinn Manual 2.0 has no realistic 
means to respond to or prevent these scenarios:  it is stuck choosing 
between escalating cyber-reprisals on the one hand (sometimes 
conveniently or falsely attributing criminal cyber-conduct to state 
agents to justify a response) and paralysis to avoid such escalation 
on the other. 
This Article submits that the cyberlaw paradigm is stuck in a 
false dichotomy—and that this false dichotomy can only be resolved 
if we gain a better understanding of the legal nature of cyberspace 
itself.  The Article is the first to establish that cyberspace as a matter 
of property law consists of a global web of correlative rights 
protected by means of a general nuisance principle.  The Article uses 
a functional comparative property and natural-resource law 
analysis to prove the existence of such a general nuisance principle 
premised upon the idea of correlative rights.  It demonstrates that 
this principle is applicable to cyberspace and is in fact consistent 
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with many of the existing starting points of cyberlaw.  But it maps 
further how and where the Tallinn 2.0 paradigm went demonstrably 
astray—and more importantly, how the cyberlaw-paradigm can 
now be set right.  Centrally, Cyber-Nuisance develops (1) how states 
and apex non-state actors (Windows, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, 
Google, and the like) share in governance obligations; (2) what the 
overarching goal of these governance obligations is—the protection 
of connectivity of cyberspace participants; and (3) an abatement-
based enforcement mechanism that escapes the escalation trap 
bedeviling the Tallinn 2.0 approach. 
The Article meaningfully advances the literature by providing a 
more precise legal framework for understanding the nature of 
cyberspace and the obligation of state and non-state actors alike to 
protect it.  This framework can explain an intuitive insight about 
cyberspace that so far has escaped cyberlaw paradigms—namely, 
that cyberspace is at once a local and a global domain giving rise to 
local and global rights and obligations.  The Article does so in a 
noticeable departure from dominant cyberlaw frameworks by 
grounding the analysis of cyberspace in comparative property law.  
It uses this lens to explain how the apparently contradictory local 
and global aspects of cyber are but flipsides of how one approaches 
correlative rights in their new, virtual context. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many great cultures have a common utopian myth:  somehow 
technology can overcome our limitations, somehow human 
ingenuity can unite mankind, somehow technology can make us 
masters of our universe.  The Middle East had Babel and its tower.1  
Plato and the Greeks had Atlantis.2  China arguably combines 
elements of both.3 
When they write the story of our civilization, it is not difficult to 
guess what will take the place of our tower of Babel, our Atlantis, 
our attempt to unite mankind and, to put it in terms of the old 
myths, rival the act of creation through human ingenuity:  
cyberspace.  Cyberspace is the dream of a united humanity 
outgrowing crude national competition.4  Cyberspace is the creation 
of a new virtual reality to supplant the shortcomings of the 
physical—to allow us to connect across global divides and harness 
technological power to command our environment.5 
But any student of ancient history—or casual fan of adventure 
movies—knows how the story ends.  The tower crumbles.6  The city 
sinks.7  Civilizations fall into deep division.8  The ambition to build 
a utopia is swallowed up in a wave of water or dust.  A combination 
of arrogance or hubris, divine fury or natural disaster, cast them 
down.9 
 
 1 Genesis 11:1-9; Brent A. Strawn, Holes in the Tower of Babel, OXFORD BIBLICAL 
STUD. ONLINE, https://global.oup.com/obso/focus/focus_on_towerbabel/ 
[https://perma.cc/AJ2S-CX4N] (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
 2 Plato, Critias, in PLATO, THE COMPLETE WORKS 1292, 1306 (John M. Cooper 
ed., 1997); Mark Cartwright, Atlantis, ANCIENT HIS. ENCYCL. (Apr. 8, 2016), 
https://www.ancient.eu/atlantis/ [https://perma.cc/4RQZ-WLW7] (providing a 
fuller introduction to the reception of the Atlantis myth). 
 3 See Ricardo Lewis, Does Chinese Civilization Come From Ancient Egypt?, FOR. 
POL’Y (Sept. 2, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/02/did-chinese-
civilization-come-from-ancient-egypt-archeological-debate-at-heart-of-china-
national-identity/ [https://perma.cc/U4WC-5R27] (discussing interpretations of 
the Records of the Grand Historian linking China to an Egyptian origin story). 
 4 See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence 
[https://perma.cc/ZHT2-GLMG]. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Genesis 11:9, supra note 1. 
 7 Cartwright, supra note 2. 
 8 Strawn, supra note 1. 
 9 Strawn, supra note 1; PLATO, supra note 2, at 1306. 
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When one looks at the state of cyberattacks today it is not hard 
to think that our sky, too, is falling.  The tools we hoped would bring 
us together around visions of a shared humanity have amplified our 
means and appetite to dehumanize even our closest neighbors.10  
And the tools we hoped would make our lives better and easier have 
instead become the means to rob us,11 imperil our critical 
infrastructure,12 surveil and potentially blackmail us,13 and even 
turn household items into weapons against us.14 
Not only that, but the tools we had hoped would take us beyond 
the nation state have become some of its most potent weapons.  
 
 10 Jon Keegan, Blue Feed, Red Feed: See Liberal Facebook and Conservative Facebook, 
Side by Side, WALL STR. J. (Aug. 19, 2019), http://graphics.wsj.com/blue-feed-red-
feed/ [https://perma.cc/23DC-WK7J]. 
 11 Hugh Son, Jamie Dimon’s worst fears for the banking industry realized with 
Capital One data hack, CNBC (July 30, 2019, 2:59 PM EDT), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/30/jamie-dimons-worst-fears-for-banks-
realized-with-capital-one-hack.html [https://perma.cc/Y6MM-U958]. 
 12 Nicole Perlroth & Scott Shane, In Baltimore and Beyond, a Stolen N.S.A. Tool 
Wreaks Havoc, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/us/nsa-hacking-tool-baltimore.html 
[https://perma.cc/LW57-W6C9]. 
 13 Neil Vigdor, Somebody’s Watching: Hackers Breach Ring Home Security 
Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/15/us/Hacked-ring-home-security-
cameras.html [https://perma.cc/5Q99-9LT8]; Jack Schofield, I got a phishing email 
that tried to blackmail me—what should I do?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2019, 3:00 PM EST), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/askjack/2019/jan/17/phishing-
email-blackmail-sextortion-webcam [https://perma.cc/WVV3-6ZPZ]. 
 14 Lily Hay Newman, Hackers Can Turn Everyday Speakers Into Acoustic 
Cyberweapons, WIRED (Aug. 11, 2019, 5:07 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/acoustic-cyberweapons-defcon/ 
[https://perma.cc/YVR6-6T2Y]. 
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States use cyber operations to spy, 15 sabotage,16 and threaten.17  They 
can use cyber operations to influence behavior.18  And they use cyber 
operations to attack the foundations of democratic civil society.19  
Given the SolarWinds attack on U.S. governmental cyber resources, 
the recent hacks of Covid-19 vaccine research, as well as the recent 
confrontation between the U.S. and Iran, it is only likely to spur 
States’ efforts to step up such operations rather than to abandon 
them.20 
 
 15 Targeting of Visma, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.   https://www.cfr.org/cyber-
operations/targeting-visma [https://perma.cc/54K4-VM9P] (last visited Mar. 7, 
2021); Lindsey O’Donnell, North Korean Spear-Phishing Attack Targets U.S. Firms, 
THREATPOST.COM (Sept. 13, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://threatpost.com/north-korean-
spear-phishing-attack-us/148299/ [https://perma.cc/XR66-DA2Y]; Christopher 
Bing, Jack Stubbs & Joseph Menn, Exclusive: Western intelligence hacked ‘Russia’s 




 16 Andy Greenberg, A Notorious Iranian Hacking Crew Is Targeting Industrial 
Control Systems, WIRED (Nov. 20, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/iran-apt33-industrial-control-systems/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ZQ7-6VHR]. 
 17 Lily Hay Newman, Russian Hackers Haven’t Stopped Probing the US Power 
Grid, WIRED (Nov. 28, 2018, 2:10 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/russian-
hackers-us-power-grid-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/9WBC-MXG9]. 
 18 See Paris Martineau, The WIRED Guide to Influencers: Everything you need to 
know about engagement, power likes, sponcon, and trust, WIRED (Dec. 6, 2019, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/what-is-an-
influencer/?itm_campaign=BottomRelatedStories_Sections_1 
[https://perma.cc/5CPP-FVPJ] (discussing the influencer phenomenon generally). 
 19 The Most Dangerous People on the Internet This Decade, WIRED (Dec. 31, 2019, 
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/most-dangerous-people-on-internet-
this-decade/ [https://perma.cc/F7XM-UFU8]. 
 20 David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth & Julian E. Barnes, As Understanding of 
Russian Hacking Grows, So Does Alarm, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/02/us/politics/russian-hacking-
government.html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/M3SL-R5NV]; 
Naomi Kresge & Daniele Lepido, Cyber Attackers Leaked Covid-19 Vaccine Data After 
EU Hack, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 12, 2021, 1:20 PM EST), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-12/covid-vaccine-
documents-leaked-on-web-eu-drug-regulator-says [https://perma.cc/N8B2-
LXQV]; Zack Doffman, Cyber Warfare Threat Rises As Iran And China Agree ‘United 
Front’ Against U.S., FORBES (July 6, 2019, 3:19 AM EDT), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/07/06/iranian-cyber-threat-
heightened-by-chinas-support-for-its-cyber-war-on-u-s/#f399adf42ebd 
[https://perma.cc/6TPH-2N2K]; Matthew Vann, 2020 campaigns ‘under-prepared’ to 
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In this environment, it is tempting to look to paradigms of cyber 
security to keep the powers we unleashed at bay.  Russian, Chinese, 
and Iranian proposals dream of radically decoupling the internet 
from a global cyberspace.21  The dominant paradigm for cyber 
governance is a less radical form of such a security approach to 
cyberspace as a whole.  It is built upon a paradigm of cyber 
responsibility enforced by carefully calibrated, quasi-military cyber 
deterrence.22  Careful not to over-threaten, it sets a high cyber-
responsibility threshold to eliminate or at the very least limit cyber 
reprisals.23  Much like the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian proposals, 
it scraps the utopias of a new technological common cyberspace 
belonging to all humankind.24  Instead, it is premised upon an 
imposition of order and State-power to seek to control the cyber 
domain.25 
It should not come as a surprise that, from a governance 
perspective at least, such efforts will always be second best.  The 
carefully constructed deterrence posture is designed to keep the 
cyber peace between States.  It also waters down any meaningful 
obligation to actually govern, make safe, and improve cyberspace 
for its users. 
If one were to impose such a responsibility on States, it would be 
easy for hackers (whether State-sponsored or not) to target their 
attacks so as to make it appear that a State’s violation of its cyber-
responsibility permitted a cyberattack on another State’s 
infrastructure.  The dominant paradigm seeks to avoid precisely this 
scenario.26  As leading experts warn, increased calls for greater 
responsibility are likely to lead to greater disruption, not greater 
 
cyberattacks-experts/story?id=67138383 [https://perma.cc/7QAH-8HGW]; Zolan 
Kanno-Youngs & Nicole Perlroth, Iran’s Military Response May Be ‘Concluded,’ but 
Cyberwarfare Threat Grows, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/us/politics/iran-attack-cyber.html 
[https://perma.cc/39UH-64ZR]. 
 21 Justin Sherman, Russia and Iran Plan to Fundamentally Isolate the Internet, 
WIRED (June 6, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/russia-and-iran-
plan-to-fundamentally-isolate-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/WMY6-WNQX]. 
 22 INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS AT THE INVITATION OF THE NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. 
CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE 
TO CYBER OPERATIONS 84 r. 14 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) (“TALLINN 2.0”) 
(citations to Tallinn 2.0 are to page, rule (r.) and comment paragraph (¶)). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 11 r. 1 ¶ 5. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Eric Talbot Jensen & Sean Watts, A Cyber Duty of Diligence: Gentle Civilizer 
or Crude Destabilizer?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1555 (2017). 
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tranquility.27  But this means that the current paradigm retreats from 
much of cyberspace as essentially ungovernable—suggesting that 
Russia, Iran, and China may be on to something when they desire 
simply to be able to shut it off.28 
This leaves the question—is there a better way or are we doomed 
to watch our infrastructure crumble, our virtual community sink?  
Utopian hopes for good cyber-governance exclusively beyond the 
State today appear naïve.29  But dystopian security paradigms 
rooted in exclusive State power do not fare any better at conserving 
cyberspace.30  Their logic, too, potentially threatens cyberspace’s 
very existence and certainly does away with its original promise.31 
This Article suggests that there is hope yet for cyber-governance.  
This hope begins with a clearer understanding of what cyberspace 
is.  Drawing on political economy literature, the Article argues that 
cyberspace is a commons.32  Particularly, it suggests that cyberspace 
can meaningfully be analogized to water rights in the commons 
literature.  The commons literature explains that what matters is the 
sustainable use of water—and the efforts that must be made by all 
users to maintain physical infrastructure and limit waste to secure 
such sustainable access.33  This Article will submit that the same 
logic holds for the sustainable use of the common resource in 
cyberspace:  its connectivity.  To secure this connectivity, all cyber-
users must participate in the physical maintenance of cyber-
infrastructure and diligently root out destructive use of the cyber-
commons. 
The problem is that as of yet, there is no bridge between the 
commons rationale in political economy and a legal understanding 
of the cyber-commons.  Existing frameworks either apply the wrong 
property paradigm or no property paradigm at all to their 
 
 27 Id. at 1558. 
 28 See Sherman, supra note 21. 
 29 See Andy Greenberg, It’s Been 20 Years Since This Man Declared Cyberspace 
Independence, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2016, 9:58 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/its-been-20-years-since-this-man-declared-
cyberspace-independence/ [https://perma.cc/L3UN-2XW2]. 
 30 See Sherman, supra note 21. 
 31 See Sherman, supra note 21. 
 32 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (2015) [hereinafter “OSTROM”]; ELINOR 
OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005) [hereinafter “OSTROM 
DIVERSITY”].  For an application of Ostrom’s theory to cyberspace governance, see 
Scott J. Shackelford, The Law of Cyber Peace, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 29-37 (2017). 
 33 See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 76-80, n. 20. 
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governance model of cyber.  The utopian understandings would 
place cyberspace beyond property into a completely shared 
resource.34  This precisely misunderstands the nature of the 
commons outlined in the political economy literature.  The security 
paradigm reduces cyberspace to exclusive property rights—in other 
words, sovereignty.35  This understanding of property rights in the 
security paradigm is unsustainable as a matter of property law:  not 
even Texas oil barons could make such an absolute claim to all 
mineral rights they hold in fee simple determinable.36 
This Article is the first to develop such a full property law 
understanding of cyber-commons to square the circle on the basis of 
a functional comparative property law analysis.  This analysis shows 
that the world’s leading jurisdictions recognize a commons-based 
property entitlement between no ownership and full ownership:  
correlative rights.  Global property laws protect, and thus define, 
correlative right by means of a nuisance logic.  This nuisance logic 
of correlative rights actively protects the commons.  It further creates 
reservoir communities and serves to enforce sustainable community 
standards. 
The correlative rights approach escapes traps bedeviling the 
dominant security paradigm and cyber-utopias.  Unlike the security 
paradigm, cyber-nuisance does not enforce the infringement of 
correlative rights through potentially spiraling countermeasures.  
Rather, the self-help remedy for a nuisance is abatement—the 
removal of the nuisance to secure the commons.  Hackers seeking to 
encourage States to resort to excessive self-help would only 
encourage increased efforts at conservation.  Rather than a vicious 
circle of countermeasure begetting countermeasure, such an 
approach would create a virtuous circle of conservation begetting 
more conservation.  The law allows States to govern up, in the sense 
of repairing cyberspace and hardening its defenses.  It does not 
allow States to govern down by letting even more cyberspace fall into 
decay for fear of assuming unwanted responsibility and risk of State 
reprisals. 
Unlike the utopias, cyber-nuisance would anchor the 
responsibility for governance both in State and non-State conduct.  
 
 34 See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital 
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 518-9 (2003). 
 35 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 11. 
 36 See David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern Property 
Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 19 PENN STATE ENV’T. L. REV. 241, 245-
46 (2011). 
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States have an important role to play precisely because they have 
jurisdiction over key parts of cyber-infrastructure and cyber 
conduct.37  But a nuisance approach understands that States are not 
the only actors with correlative rights or correlative duties.  Rather, 
cyber-nuisance looks to the conduct of all cyber-participants to set 
responsible cyber-community standards to secure sustainable 
cyber-community rights.  This feature of cyber-nuisance—that it 
draws in State and non-State actors as rights-holders and 
participants in governance—mirrors that of political economy 
literature from which this Article departed.38  It gives flesh to the 
theoretical concept of “polycentric governance” underpinning the 
political economy literature of the commons by showing how such 
community standards become part and parcel of legally cognizable 
and legally secure correlative rights.39 
This Article is organized in six parts.  Part II outlines the 
dominant security paradigm premised in cyber responsibility.  Part 
III outlines the key governance blind spots for this paradigm.  Part 
IV introduces the concept of cyber as a commons.  Part V outlines 
how a general principle of cyber-nuisance established on the basis 
of comparative property law analysis conceives a cyber-commons in 
terms of correlative rights and the protection of these correlative 
rights.  Part VI then concludes with the key cyber-governance 
implications of the cyber-nuisance correlative rights paradigm. 
II. CYBER-RESPONSIBILITY 
International cyber governance is a core concern for the 
international community.40  In fact, it is probably fair to say that 
rather than suffering from a dearth of governance ideas, cyber 
suffers the opposite problem:  an overabundance of ideas as to how 
 
 37 See Michael Schmitt, In Defense of Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 
JUSTSECURITY.ORG (May 8, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55876/defense-
sovereignty-cyberspace/ [https://perma.cc/SS6R-3X2A]. 
 38 OSTROM DIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 281-86.  
 39 OSTROM DIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 281-86. 
 40 See The Application of International Law in Cyberspace: State of Play, UN OFF. 
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cyber governance does or should function.41  There are thus many 
different candidates of conduct to choose from if one were to ask a 
cyber-expert what code governs cyber. 
Despite this abundance of different approaches, one approach to 
cyber governance should be treated as the first among equals.42  That 
governance paradigm is the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International 
Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallin 2.0).43  Tallinn 2.0 is the result 
of an international law study conducted by leading cyber security 
experts.44  Tallinn 2.0 codified 154 international law rules on the 
conduct of cyber operations.45 
The goal of Tallinn 2.0 is to translate the rules governing general 
international law to cyber.46  The key matrix according to which 
Tallinn 2.0 seeks to achieve this translation is through the lens of 
responsibility.47  It translates the general international law of state 
responsibility into the cyber realm.48 
 
 41 See e.g., LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 20-
21 (2014). 
 42 See e.g., Molly Sauter, Show Me on the Map Where They Hacked You: Cyberwar 
and the Geospatial Internet Doctrine, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 63, 70 (2015) 
(submitting that Tallinn Manual is the dominant paradigm in cyber); see also Harold 
H. Koh, Keynote Address: The Emerging Law of 21st Century War, 66 EMORY L.J. 487, 
504 (2017) (singling out only the Tallinn Manual 2.0 when discussing current cyber 
governance instruments); Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 598-652 (2018) 
(outlining that States’ practices in response to the Tallinn rules are uneven). 
 43 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22. 
 44 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at xxiii-xvix. 
 45 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at xxiii-xvix. 
 46 See Phil Spector, In Defense of Sovereignty, in the Wake of Tallinn 2.0, 111 AJIL 
UNBOUND 219, 219 (2017-2018) (explaining that the expert authors of which he was 
one compiled “the Tallinn translation of international law to the cyber 
domain.”(WC:10)) 
 47 See Jensen & Watts, supra note 26 (explaining the link between the Tallinn 
2.0 approach and classic state responsibility). 
 48 Spector, supra note 46, at 219; Jensen & Watts, supra note 26, at 1560.  One 
key discussion in the literature remains whether cyber is just another new 
technology.  Thus, “the fact that human beings have developed new technologies 
over time, such as trains, cars, telephones, televisions, and mobile phones, does not 
mean that these create new ‘domains’ or ‘spaces’ which cannot be subject to existing 
legal rules or principles, such as tort or criminal law.”  (WC:46) Dapo Akande, 
Antonio Coco, & Talita de Souza Dias, Old Habits Die Hard: Applying Existing 
International Law in Cyberspace and Beyond, EJIL TALK! (Jan. 5, 2021), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/old-habits-die-hard-applying-existing-international-
law-in-cyberspace-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/UQ7Z-L84T].  For the reasons 
that will become apparent in this article, cyber poses new problems beyond those 
of other new technologies.  Translation therefore is more difficult to achieve—even 
if the impulse that law remains applicable is certainly apt. 
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This focus on responsibility means that Tallinn 2.0 governance 
must answer three related questions.  First, who is responsible?49  
When we speak of “responsibility,” we typically look for a 
“culprit”—the person who deserves the blame or sometimes, 
though by connotation more rarely, the praise for a certain state of 
affairs.50  Second, is what was done wrong or unlawful? 51  This 
echoes the synonyms we typically associate with responsibility:  
“blame, fault, liability.”52  Third, what can we do about it in a space 
without effective courts?53  This links fault with remedies of self-help 
known in international law as countermeasures.54 
The Tallinn 2.0 experts begin their quest for cyber responsibility 
by translating a core principle of general international law to cyber:  
the “State bears international responsibility for a cyber related act 
that is attributable to the State and that constitutes a breach of an 
international legal obligation.”55  To determine if a state is 
“responsible”—that is, a culprit—is to translate the international law 
governing attribution to cyber.56  
In general international law, an action is attributable to the State 
in five broad general instances, namely, if the acts are: (1) acts of state 
organs (government ministries etc.);57 (2) acts of organs of third 
states placed at the disposal of the State;58 (3) acts of persons 
empowered by law to exercise governmental authority acting under 
color of law;59 (4) acts under the instruction, direction, or control of 
 
 49 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 79-110. 
 50 Responsibility, definition 1.a, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2019), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/responsibility 
[https://perma.cc/LSR8-3TR7] (last visited Apr. 9, 2021). 
 51 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 177-511. 
 52 Responsibility, synonyms, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2019), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/responsibility 
[https://perma.cc/LSR8-3TR7] (last visited Apr. 9, 2021). 
 53 TALLINN 2.0, supra note22, at 111-135. 
 54 See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 97-100 (2006). 
 55 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 84.  Akande, supra note 48Error! Bookmark 
not defined. (discussing agreement among different approaches on this point). 
 56  TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 84.  
 57 Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 40-42 (2001) [hereinafter 
“ILC Articles”]. 
 58 Id. at 43-45. 
 59 Id. at 42-43. 
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the State;60 or (5) acts acknowledged and adopted as their own by 
the State.61 
In addition to these broad categories, general international law 
has special rules governing insurrections and failure of 
governmental authority.62  Finally, general international law 
provides that it is not a defense to attribution that certain conduct 
was in excess of official authority or in contravention to official 
instructions.63 
Tallinn 2.0 translates these principles in Rule 15 governing cyber 
operations by state organs;64 Rule 16 governing cyber operations by 
organs of third states placed at the disposal of the State;65 and Rule 
17 governing cyber operations by non-State actors.66 
The key provision given the problem of tracing cyber conduct to 
specific individuals is Rule 17.  It collapses ILC Articles 8 and 11 on 
State Responsibility into a single rule providing that conduct under 
the instruction, direction, or control of the State, as well as conduct 
adopted by the State as its own, is attributable.67 
Having established what kind of conduct should count as State 
conduct, Tallinn 2.0 then sets out to establish rules for what kind of 
conduct is impermissible.  That is, it tries to codify international 
legal prohibitions.  These rules run the gamut, from rules governing 
special regimes of international law such as human rights,68 
diplomatic and consular relations,69 the law of the sea,70 to the 
prohibition of intervention in general international law,71 and the 
law of armed conflict.72 
This leaves the question:  what may a State do if it suffers an 
injury and the conduct leading to the injury can be attributed to 
another State and is internationally wrong?  Given the lack of 
 
 60 Id. at 47-49. 
 61 Id. at 52-54. 
 62 Id. at 49-52. 
 63 Id. at 45-47. 
 64 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 87. 
 65 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 93. 
 66 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 94. 
 67 Compare TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 94 with ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 
47-49, 52-54. 
 68 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 179-208. 
 69 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 209-231. 
 70 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 232-258. 
 71 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 312-327. 
 72 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 373-562. 
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international courts of general jurisdiction, this question frequently 
boils down to what kind self-help a State may deploy to bring the 
wrongdoer to heel.73  In general international law, this question is 
governed by the law of countermeasures.  Such countermeasures 
permit States to suspend the performance of international legal 
obligations owed to the wrongdoer until the wrongdoer has stopped 
its violation of the State’s international legal rights.74  
Countermeasures must be proportionate to the injury suffered.75  
Before implementing countermeasures, a State must give the 
wrongdoer an opportunity to cease and desist from its wrongful 
conduct voluntarily.76  But in any event, the State may not threaten 
the use of force or violate fundamental international law norms 
including fundamental human rights norms.77 
Tallinn 2.0 translates these rules on countermeasures into the 
cyber-context.  It entitles States to take countermeasures, “whether 
cyber in nature or not,” for the violation of an international legal 
obligation.78  Consistent with general international law, the purpose 
of countermeasures must be to bring about the cessation of wrongful 
conduct.79  Tallinn 2.0 stresses that countermeasures may not 
“amount to prohibited belligerent reprisal.”80  This links the 
discussion of countermeasures to the threshold when a cyber-
operation is akin to the use of force.81  This threshold prohibits 
operations that in “[their] scale and effects are comparable to non-
cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”82  In other 
words, it does not matter whether a powerplant explodes because it 
is hit by a bomb or malware; this, however, leaves many devastating 
cyber operations in play such as “cyber psychological operations 
intended solely to undermine confidence in a government.”83  
 
 73 See generally Eric Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (John 
M. Olin. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 233, 2004) (discussing why “the only 
international court with general subject matter jurisdiction over international legal 
issues” has been utilized less and less frequently over time). 
 74 ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 120, 137. 
 75 ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 134-35. 
 76 ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 135-37. 
 77 ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 131-34. 
 78 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 111. 
 79 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 116. 
 80 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 122-23. 
 81 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 123. 
 82 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 330. 
 83 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 331. 
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Finally, Tallinn 2.0 also insists that countermeasures must be 
proportionate to the injury suffered but is explicit that it does not 
require reciprocity of visiting the same injury on the wrongdoer as 
suffered by the State enacting a countermeasure.84 
Despite this broad scope of the rules of general international law 
translated to cyber, it is possible to crystalize a few general 
principles underlying most of them.  First, as a general rule, States 
may not interfere by cyber means in the affairs of other States or 
individuals beyond their territorial boundaries.85  Second, the 
principle of proportionality plays a continuing rule in the regulation 
of cyber conduct.86  This principle is broadly applicable in the 
context of measures taken in response to threats both in the inter-
State sphere and in the human rights context.87  Third, there remains 
a strong reserved domain for States to continue to exercise near 
absolute authority in organizing their own political system and 
organization.88 
Perhaps the most controversial and important general duty 
contained in Tallinn 2.0 is the duty of diligence.89  This duty requires 
that the state protect others against harm from within its borders.90  
This duty of diligence, however, does not impose a duty to 
monitor.91  Rather, it requires only that the State respond to 
circumstances of which it has actual or constructive knowledge.92  
The duty is controversial because states, understandably, do not like 
obligations of diligence imposed on them, given that it severely 
limits their range of action—and their range of plausible 
deniability.93 
 
 84 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 127-28. 
 85 Eric Talbot Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights, GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 743, 758, 760, 763, 769, 771-72, 775-76 (2017). 
 86 Id. 754, 761. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 775. 
 89 Jensen & Watts, supra note 26, at 1566-67; Jensen, supra note 85, at 744-76; 
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 30-50. 
 90 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 43. 
 91 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22,  at 41-42. 
 92 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22,  at 41-42.  
 93 Efrony & Shany, supra note 42, at 645-55. 
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III. CRACKS IN THE CODE 
a. The Connectivity Blind Spot 
Tallinn 2.0 runs into conceptual problems almost from the outset.  
The Tallinn-2.0 approach to global cyber law is classically State-
based.94  Tallinn 2.0 codifies international cyber law by translating 
general international law rules into the new cyber context.95  
International law is the law between sovereigns.96  So international 
cyber law must also be exclusively the law governing State 
conduct.97 
This syllogism—international law is the law between States; 
international cyber law is international law; thus, international cyber 
law is the law between States governing cyber—holds good in 
academic public international law and the law of armed conflict.98  It 
is therefore unsurprising that it would hold sway as a foundational 
matter for Tallinn 2.0.  After all, the experts drafting Tallinn 2.0 were 
experts in these fields.99 
This syllogism of course does not suggest that all non-State 
conduct in cyber is legally irrelevant.  Quite to the contrary.  It is just 
not an issue for international cyber law.  It is a matter subject to the 
jurisdiction of domestic courts and regulation by domestic law.100 
 
 94 See TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17 (conceiving of cyber law around the 
premise of violation of sovereignty). 
 95 Spector, supra note 46, at 219. 
 96 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-
15 (9th ed. 2019);  JAMES CRAWFORD, CHANCE, ORDER, CHANGE: THE COURSE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 
(2014)("CRAWFORD 2014”) (“If international law is the law between States (as 
historically conceived), and in some sense is derived beyond the control of domestic 
constitutional arrangements, by contrast the locus of validity of municipal law is a 
matter which is the first and usually the last place of local constitutional ordering.”). 
 97 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17. 
 98 See CRAWFORD, supra note 96, at 14-15 (general international law governs 
relationship between states); GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 189 (2d ed. 2016) (law of armed conflict 
governs conflicts between states of a certain kind) 
 99 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at xii-xviii. 
 100 CRAWFORD, supra note 96, at 440-470; Nori Katagiri, Why International Law 
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Tallinn 2.0 follows traditional international law in treating non-
State conduct as an issue subject to domestic regulation.101  Thus, 
international cyber law “does not extend to the actions of non-State 
actors unless such actions are attributable to a State.”102  It does not 
apply to corporate conduct.103  It does not even apply to the conduct 
of terrorist groups.104  Tallinn 2.0 is unequivocal on this point.105 
Tallinn 2.0 sets out that such non-State conduct is subject to the 
ordinary domestic criminal jurisdiction of States themselves.106  
Thus a corporation hacking a State would be subject to the criminal 
process of its home state.107  Presumably, the corporation would also 
be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the State at the receiving end 
of the hack.108  Tallinn 2.0, in sum, treats non-State conduct as 
potentially criminal activity under domestic law and subjects 
international cyber-criminal prosecutions to much of the same 
strictures as ordinary criminal process. 
This approach has a significant conceptual blind spot.  Tallinn 
2.0 might work if it seamlessly imposed an obligation on the State to 
criminalize, monitor, and enforce cyber-crime law in its jurisdiction 
and cooperate with other States in the enforcement of their cyber 
laws.  If that were the case, there would be no need for international 
cyber law to reach the conduct of non-State actors in order to 
safeguard international cyber governance:  the obligation in 
international cyber law for domestic law to bear the brunt of cyber 
governance and regulation of non-State actors plausibly would fill 
the governance gap of a purely State-based paradigm.109 
Problematically, Tallinn 2.0 does not follow such an approach.  
To the contrary, it is explicit that the diligence principle does not 
imply an obligation to take preventive measures to interdict cyber 
harm from non-State actors.110  What is more, there is not even an 
 
 101 See Schmitt, supra note 37.  For additional context, see also Akande, supra 
note 48. 
 102 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17. 
 103 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17-18. 
 104 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 18.  
 105 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 18. 
 106 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 51. 
 107 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17-18 
 108 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 60-66. 
 109 For a discussion of such a paradigm, see Frédéric G. Sourgens, The Paris 
Paradigm, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1637 (2019). 
 110 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 44. 
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obligation to monitor cyber activity by non-State actors.111  In short, 
Tallinn 2.0 imposes no obligation on States to regulate, monitor, and 
enforce cyber conduct on the domestic level.112  Its diligence 
obligation only covers the obligation to cease and desist or interdict 
future conduct once existing conduct has already caused significant 
cross-boundary adverse consequences abroad.113 
This threshold was set with an eye towards the availability of 
countermeasures.114  A low threshold for diligence obligations 
increases the opportunity (or excuse) for significant 
countermeasures.115  Given the significant range of available cyber 
countermeasures outlined above, this is clearly an undesirable 
result. 
But from any governance perspective, such a diligence 
obligation is too toothless to bite:  it permits States to wait for 
significant adverse consequences before acting.116  As far as 
governance design goes, this has “diligence” backwards.  Diligence 
is an exercise in understanding risk for significant adverse 
consequences before they arise and not after.117  The point of diligence 
is to “avoid nasty surprises.”118  The point of governance is to enlist 
stakeholders to avoid disaster to the greatest extent possible and 
sustainable.119  Diligence is a tool to achieve this end.  Tallinn 2.0 
diligence, unlike governance, only springs into action once there is 
a crisis.  This fundamentally misunderstands the point of 
diligence.120 
Tallinn 2.0’s understanding of diligence is even more 
problematic in the cyber context.  This problem can best be 
illustrated by way of example.  On June 27, 2017, the world suffered 
 
 111 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 45. 
 112 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 45. 
 113 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 43. 
 114 Jensen & Watts, supra note 26, at 1563-64. 
 115 See Jensen & Watts, supra note 26, at 1563-64. 
 116 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 40. 
 117 See LINDA S. SPEDDING, DUE DILIGENCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 
(2004). 
 118 Rodrigo Amaral, Due diligence: making sure there are no nasty surprises, 
RACONTEUR (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.raconteur.net/finance/due-diligence-
making-sure-there-are-no-nasty-surprises [https://perma.cc/WFQ7-259F]. 
 119 MARK BEVIR, GOVERNANCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 1-10 (2012). 
 120 While diligence also has a role to play in crisis management, this is not its 
principal role.  Udaibir S. Das & Marc Quintyn, Crisis Prevention and Crisis 
Management: The Role of Regulatory Governance 42-48 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 02/163, 2002). 
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a devastating cyberattack dubbed “NotPetya.”121  Western 
intelligence services believe that Russia deployed NotPetya as a 
cyberattack against Ukraine.122  The Russian government steadfastly 
denies this charge.123 
What is undisputed is that NotPetya spread from Ukraine to 
Denmark, the U.S., and India, and resulted in significant damage in 
the billions of dollars in all three jurisdictions.124  All NotPetya ever 
needed to spread beyond Ukraine was the smallest of footholds in a 
single unprotected computer in a company to shut down and destroy 
that company’s entire global IT infrastructure and infect other 
companies continents away.125  That is what apparently happened 
to Danish shipping giant Maersk, shutting down its headquarters in 
Copenhagen and much of the shipping on the U.S. Eastern 
seaboard.126  Given the scope of the initial attack, this disruption 
outside of Ukraine was likely unintended.127 
Reacting to events like NotPetya after they strike may well be an 
exercise in futility.  Once the world notices serious adverse 
consequences from a NotPetya event, it is already too late to stop it 
or even mitigate the damage.128  Therefore, to be meaningful, 
diligence must prevent cyber threats and not merely react to them. 
Tallinn 2.0’s State-based approach also suffers from an intuitive 
problem, even if it heightened state diligence obligations.  
Companies such as Windows, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, or Google 
have far greater de facto influence over cyber governance than a State 
 
 121 Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating 
Cyberattack in History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-
crashed-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/5ECZ-XMTW]. 
 122 Ellen Nakashima, Russian military was behind NotPetya cyberattack in 
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such as Nepal.129  Yet, Nepal is captured by the Tallinn 2.0 approach 
but Windows, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, and Google are not. 130  This 
leaves a significant governance gap in the cyber fabric.131 
NotPetya again is a good example for this problem—this time of 
the role of non-State actors in cyber governance.  NotPetya exploited 
a vulnerability in a Windows protocol allowing hackers to run code 
remotely on a computer without a patch for the vulnerability.132  
Windows was aware of the vulnerability partly due to news reports 
advertising an NSA hacking tool exploiting the same 
vulnerability.133  As NotPetya began its destructive work, Windows 
was working on releasing a patch, but the patch had not yet been 
fully implemented worldwide.134  Windows thus is a key player in 
any governance discussion in how to avoid another NotPetya, as is 
the diligence of critical infrastructure companies in updating 
operating systems once they have been notified of a vulnerability.  
In other words, to focus only on Russia or only on Ukraine misses 
the bigger picture of the role of non-State conduct in cyber safety. 
What is more, to understand NotPetya is to understand that 
State and non-State conduct connects and interacts on a constant 
basis.  The NSA was the first to exploit a Windows vulnerability 
with its hacking tool EternalBlue.135  Without the U.S. government-
sponsored hacking tool, would NotPetya have happened?  Then 
there is the question of the hack of the NSA by a hacking collective 
known as Shadow Brokers, which began leaking tools including 
EternalBlue from August 2016 onwards.136  Mysterious as it is, 
 
 129 See Daniel Dobrygowski, Why Companies Are Forming Cybersecurity 
Alliances, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/09/why-
companies-are-forming-cybersecurity-alliances [https://perma.cc/2XSZ-DUGZ] 
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imperative-for-nepal [https://perma.cc/6NPS-76BD] (discussing recent cyber 
threats to Nepal and Nepalese cyber capabilities). 
 130 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 40. 
 131 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 40. 
 132 Greenberg, supra note 121. 
 133 Greenberg, supra note 121. 
 134 Greenberg, supra note 121. 
 135 Greenberg, supra note 121. 
 136 Scott Shane, Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Security Breach and Spilled 




2021] Cyber-Nuisance 1025 
Shadow Brokers apparently is a non-State actor.137  Without this 
hack, would NotPetya have happened?  Moreover, there is the 
apparently slower implementation of the Windows patch in Ukraine 
by multinationals.138  Without this slow implementation would 
NotPetya have happened?  Finally, there is the deployment of 
NotPetya, the origin of which remains contested.  The story of 
NotPetya thus involves Windows, the world’s leading operating 
system, a hacker collective, the NSA, Ukraine, multinational 
companies in Ukraine, and, according to Western intelligence, 
Russia.  At each stage of development, NotPetya was possible 
because of an interaction between States and non-State actors.  To 
prevent events like NotPetya, or worse than NotPetya, means to 
capture this interaction and connectivity between all of the players 
involved, not just some of them. 
The same kind of problem arises in the context of what has been 
dubbed “the biggest espionage hack on record”:  SolarWinds.139  The 
hack accessed critical records of at least ten government agencies, as 
well as multiple apex companies, such as Microsoft.140  This 
operation had a clear espionage component.141  But it is also possible 
that it could add “something more sinister” such as “inserting 
‘backdoor’ access into government agencies, major corporations, the 
electric grid and laboratories developing and transporting new 
generations of nuclear weapons.”142  As one former national security 
official put it, hackers “will surely have used its access to further 
exploit and gain administrative control over the networks it 
considered priority targets.”143  He goes on that for “those targets, 
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the hackers will have long ago moved past their entry point, covered 
their tracks and gained what experts call “persistent access,” 
meaning the ability to infiltrate and control networks in a way that 
is hard to detect or remove.”144 
Like NotPetya, U.S. intelligence is reasonably certain that the 
hack was Russian government sponsored.145  However, official 
statements “offered no details” and in fact “made no mention of . . . 
the S.V.R., Russia’s most skilled intelligence agency.”146  
Unofficially, the role of the S.V.R. is assumed.147 
But also like NotPetya, this particular hack involved a great 
number of private entities in multiple countries.  It was a “a supply-
chain attack, meaning the pathway into the target networks relies on 
access to a supplier.”148  This supply chain attack centrally involved 
SolarWinds, an Austin, Texas, based cyber monitoring and 
management company with unrivalled access to government and 
corporate clients.149  The hack used a product named “Orion” and 
was SolarWinds’s “flagship network management software” to 
infiltrate targets.150  Centrally, “SolarWinds moved much of its 
engineering to satellite offices in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Belarus.”151  At this point, the attack involves a key private company 
doing business in multiple countries.  Such supply chain attacks 
thus again highlight the crucial importance of private actors—not 
just government actors.  And this particular attack highlights that 
such attacks can take place in multiple physical locations across 
national boundaries and thus involve a panoply of State and non-
State actors in the process. 
Tallinn 2.0 becomes dangerously ineffective as a governance tool 
because it does not fully account for this connectivity of State and 
non-State conduct in cyber.  One could thus fairly apply the 
observation to cyber that “[h]ybrid arrangements like these are 
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likely to become more common in the twenty-first century.”152  
Cyber seems to feel this strain with particular force due to the 
outsized role of non-State actors in controlling cyber infrastructure 
and attacking it in turn.  One should thus worry that “[g]iven the 
phenomenon of hybridization, one of the challenges of international 
law in the twenty-first century will be to identify the circumstances 
in which a participatory arrangement should be pierced and the 
ways in which the consequences of piercing should be dealt with.”153  
Here, Tallinn 2.0 falls short. 
b. The Attribution Vulnerability 
Given Tallinn 2.0’s State-centered approach, one of its central 
features is to determine whether particular conduct was in fact State 
conduct.  As discussed in the previous section, this question is one 
of “attribution” in public international law.154  As also discussed 
above, Tallinn 2.0 on its face follows classic international law in 
attributing conduct of State organs and conduct under the 
instruction, direction or control of the State as well as conduct 
adopted as its own by the State after the fact.155 
But Tallinn 2.0 encounters an evidentiary problem.  Cyber is 
different from other State conduct in that we are dealing with virtual 
actions rather than real ones.  To explain, to determine whether an 
organ of State acts in the brick-and-mortar context, one would point 
to official documents from a Ministry.156  To determine whether 
actions by non-State actors were under the instruction, direction, or 
control of the government in the brick-and-mortar world one looks 
for physical clues linking governmental authorities to the actions of 
a formally independent actor.157  The task is one that follows 
physical clues much in the way that Sherlock Holmes did in the 
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Victorian age158—with the possible difference that some of the 
documents previously housed in physical archives are now stored 
in the cloud and that letters have been replaced by emails.  Still, the 
issue ultimately remains establishing real world conduct by “real 
people” and not by machines. 
Tallinn 2.0 attribution does not have this luxury.  Rather, the best 
we can do in cyber is to tie machines to actions.  One example of this 
is the recent Mueller investigation into interference in the 2016 
election and particularly the indictment against Russian operatives 
resulting from the probe.159  The indictments against Russian 
military officers handed down by the Special Counsel were 
premised upon the fact that certain communications had originated 
from a certain accounts linked to a website infrastructure which, in 
turn, could be linked to a specific person.160  Further, the indictment 
linked bitcoin-denominated purchases in the same way to link them 
back to the same individuals.161 
No matter one’s conclusions whether such indictments may lead 
to convictions, this type of search is reasonably different from 
traditional sleuthing.  It tries to follow virtual breadcrumbs such as 
email addresses, bitcoin ledger entries, and cyber infrastructure, not 
brick-and-mortar breadcrumbs.162  The Mueller investigation 
followed evidence of online transactions through the bitcoin ledger 
to establish that the bitcoin to purchase certain server space that in 
turn had been linked to misinformation campaigns on social media 
had commenced at the ominous GRU office building.163 
The additional problem faced by this sort of investigation 
compared to a brick-and-mortar investigation is that it must 
ultimately make an inference from cyber reality to flesh-and-blood 
people.  The problem is that hacks are intended precisely to call such 
inferences into question and to pretend that hackers are actually 
other people, working from virtual locations and cyber 
infrastructure other their own.  In fact, that allegation was part of 
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the indictment itself.164  The conceptual problem is to distinguish 
between another, more cleverly disguised hack and the real person. 
The problem in the attribution context is that attribution 
ultimately must link back to a real person.  But creating this link 
between cyber conduct and a real person cannot rely upon 
traditional attribution rules, as traditional attribution rules did not 
typically encounter this problem.  The closest classic international 
law comes to the same set of problems is the world of espionage and 
covert operations.165  But even there, what unmasks the covert agent 
is physical evidence as opposed to inferences from virtual 
evidence.166  Thus, even if Tallinn 2.0 sounds conventional in 
following traditional international law of attribution, Tallinn 2.0 of 
necessity innovates the law of attribution to provide a way to make 
the last leap from the virtual to the real. 
Tallinn 2.0 wrestles openly with this problem.  Thus, in the 
context of attribution of conduct by state organs to the state, it notes 
that while “the use of governmental assets, in particular military 
equipment like tanks and warships, has long constituted a nearly 
irrefutable indication of attribution due to the improbability of their 
use by persons other than State organs” this inference does not 
translate easily to cyber.167  The problem is that “another State or a 
non-State actor may have acquired control over government cyber 
infrastructure.”168  Therefore, the use of cyber infrastructure only 
“can serve as an indication that the State in question may be 
associated with the operation.”169  The prevalence of spoofing makes 
this more than an academic concern.170  Tallinn 2.0 leaves it vague 
how attribution then is to function beyond the identification of the 
relevant cyber infrastructure, pointing to human intelligence and 
prudential factors.171 
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This approach to attribution leaves a sour taste.  Particularly, 
Tallinn 2.0 points to the 2013 cyber operation to shut down South 
Korean banking and media servers and computers and asserts that 
the operation was “allegedly North Korean.”172  Shortly after that 
attack, hackers leaked Sony sensitive information, including 
employee social security numbers.  The attack was originally 
attributed to North Korea.  Since then, however, cyber experts have 
expressed doubts about attributing the conduct to North Korea.173  
Despite these doubts, North Korea remained a suspect for the 
hack.174  This leaves two questions.  The first is if there are doubts 
about the Sony hack, should there be doubts about the South Korean 
hack?  Second, if attribution cannot firmly be established, then what 
is the consequence for Tallinn 2.0’s state-based, fault-based 
paradigm? 
The same concern is only heightened in the context of attribution 
due to governmental instruction, direction, or control under ILC 
Article 8 and Tallinn 2.0 Rule 17.175  If it is difficult to establish action 
by a state organ, this difficulty is only increased in the context of 
indirect state action through the exercise of direction or control over 
formally non-State conduct.  Tallinn 2.0 notes as an example of 
effective control “a case in which one State plans and oversees an 
operation to use software updates to implant new vulnerabilities in 
software widely used by another State in its governmental 
computers.  The former State concludes a confidential contract to 
embed the exploits with the company that produces” the 
software.176 
This scenario outlined by Tallinn 2.0 recalls the reported covert 
collaboration between Siemens and the German intelligence service, 
the Bundesnachrichtendienst.  Siemens constructed Iran’s nuclear 
reactor for supposedly civilian purposes.  Siemens used this access 
to collaborate with the Bundesnachrichtendienst to allow German 
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intelligence to spy on the Iranian nuclear program.177  Siemens also 
extended this cooperation to granting the Bundesnachrichtendienst 
access to communications technology and thus allowing the agency 
to decrypt Iranian secret communications.178  This collaboration also 
gave the Bundesnachrichtendienst alleged privilege access to 
encrypted messages from Russia, Egypt, and Oman.179  Tallinn 2.0 
essentially updates such an intelligence cooperation from hardware 
(communication system provided by Siemens) to software. 
In fact, Iran accused Siemens of complicity in the Stuxnet 
cyberattack on its nuclear centrifuges along just such grounds.  
Stuxnet was a worm used to infiltrate the SCADA operating system 
controlling centrifuges used to enrich fissile material used as fuel in 
nuclear reactors (or payload in a nuclear bomb).180  The Stuxnet 
worm destroyed the centrifuges at the Iranian nuclear facility and 
reportedly was the first cyberweapon to lead to such physical 
destruction.181  Iran alleged that the SCADA operating system had 
purposefully left a backdoor open for the attack much in the way 
suggested by the Tallinn 2.0 attribution approach, relying on the past 
close collaboration between Siemens and intelligence services and 
the fact that many of the critical components in Iran’s programs were 
made by Siemens.182 
The problem is that many cyber operations comprise 
significantly more layers between the official State organs and the 
shadowy perpetrators executing the operation.  In this context, 
Tallinn 2.0 is arguably of little to no help to attribute conduct to the 
state:  “a State’s preponderant or decisive participation in the 
‘financing, organizing, training, supplying, and equipping . . . the 
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selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of 
the whole of its operation’ has been found insufficient to reach the 
‘effective control’ threshold.”183  Ominously, this means that the 
cyber activities of this group are not attributable to the State.184 
One again has to place this conceptual language into 
perspective.  A cooperation between Siemens and the 
Bundesnachrichtendienst is arguably attributable to Germany because 
Germany structured its alleged cooperation through an officially 
sanctioned conduit (its intelligence service).  But what about 
“patriotic hackers?”  The term gained currency when President 
Putin of Russia was asked about Russian interference in the 2016 
election.  In response, “Russian President Vladimir Putin said . . . his 
country has ‘never engaged in’ hacking another nation’s elections, 
but left open the possibility that hackers with ‘patriotic leanings . . . 
may try to add their contribution to the fight against those who 
speak badly about Russia.’”185 
Hitting precisely on Tallinn 2.0 concepts, President Putin 
continued that “[h]ackers are free people, just like artists who wake 
up in the morning in a good mood and start painting.”186  These 
hackers may thus be supported by the Russian state—though 
President Putin did not concede as much—but they are not under 
the direction or effective control of the Russian State; they “are free 
people.”187  Their conduct therefore is not attributable to the Russian 
Federation. 
This distinction between alleged German and alleged Russian 
conduct shows the serious problem for the attribution provisions in 
Tallinn 2.0.  They fail to live up their promise precisely because of 
the first problem identified in the previous section:  only State 
conduct is covered by Tallinn 2.0 and Tallinn 2.0 does not impose a 
duty on the State to police its own cyberspace.188  This means that 
actors can collaborate with States time and time again without being 
subject to criminal sanction on the territories of these States.189  And 
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yet the conduct of these non-State actors is not attributable to the 
State either as the State does not exercise sufficient control over the 
operation.190  While at the time of this writing it is “too early to tell” 
how the attribution story will play out in the SolarWinds hack, 
similar questions will likely abound.191  
 Thus, it is one thing if the hack was perpetrated directly by a 
Russian state organ (although again, it is at this point not clear that 
it was so perpetrated even though there is significant suspicion to 
that effect).192  It is another thing if it, too, was performed by 
freelance patriotic hackers.  Such a freelance approach would 
certainly be possible with a pure intelligence hack193 (former 
intelligence operatives sell information to the government after 
receiving materials from the government).  It would leave more to 
chance to allow such freelancers to install backdoors and then sell 
the access after the fact.  But even such a strategy would not be 
unheard of—Russian government officials have long been 
suspected of relying on complex nominee structures to dissociate 
themselves from sensitive but very high value transactions.194 
Be that as it may, the fact that the hack remained undetected for 
as long as it did means that an intruder of any competence is likely 
to have cleaned up their tracks.195  It is unlikely that backdoors will 
be easily discovered.196  And given that the hack itself was not 
discovered in real-time, it is similarly unlikely that the hackers 
would have left behind significant breadcrumbs without raising 
suspicions that they meant to leave them.197  In either case, the 
attribution analysis will be fraught with guesswork (and second 
guesswork). 
In other words, Tallinn 2.0 illustrates how to get between the wall 
and the wallpaper of the Tallinn 2.0 approach (and thus escape 
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lawful countermeasures).  So long as the aid received from the State 
is not itself a violation of another international norm (and frequently 
the aid may well be innocuous enough, such as when the State 
provides hardware or generic training),198 and so long as the State 
has plausible deniability of what “patriotic hackers” are doing,199 
and so long as these hackers make sure to take advantage of the 
connectivity issues in cyber discussed in the previous section, the 
underlying conduct is beyond the reach of the law.200  It is therefore 
reasonable to suspect that these blind spots in Tallinn 2.0, when 
combined, provide a blueprint for governance avoidance as much 
as they provide a blueprint for a governance model. 
c. The Fault Trap 
Tallinn 2.0’s governance avoidance problem is further 
exacerbated by its focus on responsibility.  This focus on 
responsibility means that a State is only accountable if it acted 
wrongfully.  Accordingly, the state must be at fault for it to be 
responsible for its conduct. 
This fault paradigm constructs a dangerous governance trap.  To 
paraphrase Yoda the Elder, fault leads to fear.  Fear leads to blame.  
Blame leads to deflection.  Deflection leads to willful blindness.201 
Such willful blindness is one of the greatest threats to 
governance structures.  It does not proactively make information 
available that could have been used to formulate accurate threat 
assessments and devise effective responses to avoid or mitigate the 
threat.  In other words, it is trapped in the compartmentalization of 
responsibilities that led to significant intelligence failures in the U.S. 
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in the run up to 9/11.202  Concerns with responsibility and potential 
blame led to an under-sharing of critical information and thus 
culminated in a failure to respond to a national security threat that 
otherwise might have been forestalled.203 
Tallinn 2.0 seeks to avoid this fault trap through its general 
diligence obligation.204  States have an obligation to halt activity they 
know to cause significant adverse consequences internationally—
even if the State did not itself perpetrate these actions.205  It gives the 
State an out to deflect into action rather than into inaction.  Further, 
Tallinn 2.0 seeks to remedy willful blindness concerns by making 
States responsible for their constructive knowledge—that is, 
knowledge that a like-situated State would have had in similar 
circumstances.206 
Tallinn 2.0’s attempt to escape the fault trap, however, tends to 
lead right back into it.  An example again helps illustrate this 
problem.  In the week of December 16, 2019, the City of Frankfurt 
shut down its IT network.207  The reason for the shutdown was the 
fear of a spread of an Emotet infection leading to ransomware 
attacks.208 
Emotet is “an advanced, modular banking Trojan that primarily 
functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans.”209  
An Emotet infection is notoriously hard to detect because it “can 
evade typical signature-based detection.”210  It is further hard to 
remove from infected systems.211  An Emotet infection spreads 
through malspam.212  Importantly, Emotet can take over infected 
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machines and disseminate more malspam from infected accounts.213  
Emotet steals sensitive banking information from infected machines 
and has since morphed into a ransomware tool.214 
The City of Frankfurt’s actions were commendable in stopping 
the spread of a potentially dangerous cyber-infiltration by cyber 
criminals.  Yet, had the City of Frankfurt (or the German 
government) conducted a Tallinn 2.0 analysis, it might well have 
been dissuaded from acting.  The consequence of acting is an 
admission by the City of Frankfurt that Emotet infections like the 
one it suffered are in fact detectable and, if left unaddressed, can lead 
to significant adverse consequences.  In other words, it is an 
admission of knowledge and thus a trigger for a diligence obligation 
that the failure to abide is wrongful.215 
This leads to a problem in its own right.  Once knowledge is 
admitted, the diligence obligation vests.216  It thus means that falling 
short of acting diligently from that point forward entails fault, and 
as such, liability.217  Importantly, inaction would have had no such 
consequence:  there was of yet no significant adverse consequence.  
The measure was preventive, and as such, a failure to take it would 
not have been wrongful under Tallinn 2.0.218  That means that 
inaction is “free,” and action potentially exposes an actor to liability.  
Anyone facing those consequences may well choose not to act out of 
precaution and thus avoid disaster. 
This not the end of the problem:  taking action once implies an 
obligation to take similar action again in the future or be subject to 
countermeasures.  Now that one has taken action, one has 
constructive knowledge that future similar threats also will lead to 
significant adverse consequences.219  Constructive knowledge 
implies that to act once creates an obligation to act again.  Action, in 
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other words, appears to create a preventive duty for future cyber 
threats where none otherwise exists.220  This again is far from ideal.  
It again, strictly speaking, would counsel to inaction rather than 
action. 
The fault trap thus creates incentives not to govern up, in the 
sense of creating ever more sustainable governance structures that 
progressively improve cyber safety.  To the contrary, the fault trap 
creates incentives to govern down, in the sense of acting only in a 
limited set of circumstances after a threat has already materialized 
to avoid future liability—or more pressingly, future lawful 
countermeasures.  The fault trap is deeply destructive of good 
governance precisely because it creates no incentives to anticipate 
and coordinate positive responses. 
One might object that if the City of Frankfurt had not acted, it 
certainly would have had to act in the aftermath of an Emotet attack.  
It would have been left to clean up the mess of the cyberattack.  This 
may factually be true.  Legally, however, the connectivity issue 
outlined in section III(a) makes sure that the City of Frankfurt could 
point to others as being at fault for any adverse consequences.221  It 
could have pointed to vulnerabilities in recipients of City emails.  It 
could blame operating systems.  It could even seek to blame a third 
State for conducting a cyberattack against Germany.  All of these 
strategies would deflect blame, undercut constructive knowledge, 
and lie fault at someone’s else feet.  A fault paradigm, in other 
words, is a horrible paradigm for any governance infrastructure to 
evolve and adapt to emergent threats.  Given the fluidity of cyber in 
this respect, that is bad news for Tallinn 2.0. 
d. Conclusion 
Tallinn 2.0 seeks to do the right thing.  It seeks to provide a legal 
matrix to guide decision-making in cyber.  It does so on the basis of 
strong values embedded in general international law and an 
analysis of state practice.  Yet, as this section has shown, its State- 
and fault-based approach has created significant issues for the 
accomplishment of its goals.  Thus, Tallinn 2.0 provides a roadmap 
not only for compliance but also for avoidance.  And the roadmap 
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for avoidance is clearer (and cheaper) than the roadmap for 
compliance. 
It may be that this is the best that can be done.  No other 
translation may currently be possible.  Bad incentives in general 
international law can be a good incentive to devise a better, treaty-
based structure going forward. 
As this Article outlines, a turn of the kaleidoscope might be able 
to place the Tallinn 2.0 on stronger footing.  This turn of the 
kaleidoscope would, at least in the soft sense, impose greater 
obligations on States.  This makes it unlikely that States will shower 
it with praise. 
And yet, it will have two advantages.  First, for States, it also 
provides new partners with whom governance should become 
significantly more feasible—apex platform, apex programming, and 
apex infrastructure companies.  Second, for international lawyers, it 
provides a better means to give legal force to international legal 
obligations, even in the absence of state-practice.  It demonstrates 
that the application of a general principle of law can overcome the 
lack of positive consent to cyber norms.  In this case, this more robust 
set of obligations may in fact prompt action to codify a more 
meaningful governance approach that would streamline the 
respective diligence obligations and governance structures to 
harness the promise of cyber. 
IV. CYBER-COMMONS 
The core proposal of this Article is to overcome the problems of 
the responsibility paradigm by replacing it with a commons 
paradigm.  Such a commons paradigm would move away from a 
purely State-based approach to governance and allow additional 
actors to become core governance participants.  It would also move 
away from a fault-based approach.  Instead, it will focus on the 
concept of using—and of correlative rights to use—resources pooled 
in common between participants.  This focus moves away from a 
logic of blame to a logic of coordination. 
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a. Defining Commons 
Commons aggregate pooled resources.  The classical example of 
a commons is a grazing pasture.222  This grazing pasture does not 
belong to any one farmer.223  It is either not owned at all or 
communally owned by those who use it.  The concern of a commons 
is that overuse of the common pooled resource is unsustainable and 
eventually destroys the commons together with the resources it 
provided to its users.  Classically, overgrazing destroys the 
pasture.224 
This classical definition of commons sets up a stark contrast 
between resources that are privately owned and resources that are 
not owned (or communally owned) but commonly used.  This 
dichotomy would suggest that commons principally refer to 
property (for example, land) and that this property is not owned by 
any one person:  the grazing pasture is a commons because no one 
person owns the pasture.  It is this conception that led the Tallinn 2.0 
experts to reject treating cyber as a commons.225 
This classical definition does not do justice to commons or how 
common pool resources are held.  The key example of a common 
pool resource that does not follow the dichotomy between private 
and communal ownership is water.226  Water is a common pool 
resource because a large number of community members rely upon 
the same source of water in order to survive.227  Water and 
particularly groundwater can be overused—that is to say, the 
overuse of groundwater leads to the eventual complete exhaustion 
or collapse of groundwater reservoirs.228  Such a collapse would 
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deprive all users of future water access.  In this sense, groundwater 
access is like access to a grazing pasture.229 
Groundwater access is unlike access to a grazing pasture in an 
important respect:  the communities and farmers using the 
groundwater have a potentially enforceable property right in the 
water they use.230  The problem is that they hold inconsistent rights.231  
This inconsistency could lead to the ejection—and thus loss of 
rights—by a large swath of water right holders.232  This is a 
consequence that is so destructive of communities relying upon 
groundwater that it is unfathomable to impose.233  Alternatively, it 
can act as an accelerant to insisting on one’s right and could hasten 
the destruction of the groundwater reservoir; every rights holder 
would increase use so as not to admit that prior use was 
impermissible, thus hastening the demise of the commons.234 
This story of groundwater as a commons is the story of water in 
Southern California.  As Elinor Ostrom’s classical Governing the 
Commons outlines, communities in Southern California fought over 
use of the same groundwater basins.235  California law, through the 
reasonable use and correlative rights doctrines, in principle, would 
have provided a means to resolve this legal dispute.236  Yet, the 
reasonable use doctrine led to precisely the kind of disincentives 
that might cause reservoirs to collapse because timing litigation 
right was too treacherous to yield meaningful results.237  Negotiating 
to a reasonable use of a common pooled resource—and treating the 
reservoir as a commons—was the far more efficient solution.238 
Ostrom provides yet another water-based example of a 
commons—namely, access to water in the Zanjera in the 
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Philippines.239  Zanjeras are common irrigation works used to bring 
water to farmland.240  Tenant farmers in particular were able to 
exchange their labor in building these irrigation works for non-
irrigated land for tenancy rights in newly irrigated parcels.241  The 
irrigation works are communally maintained.242  Water-allocation 
typically does not create problems so long as the irrigation works 
are maintained.243  Yet, in droughts, water rights are by rotation, and 
the closing of canals is communally guarded and enforced.244 
b. Cyber as Commons 
Treating cyber as a commons is not a new idea.  A significant 
literature has developed to treat cyber as a commons.245  Much of 
this literature, as discussed in Tallinn 2.0 itself, analogizes cyber to 
the deep sea.246  It therefore submits that cyber should be treated as 
owned in common.247 
This is not the only way to treat cyber as a commons.  Rather, 
one can treat cyber as a commons in the sense of water rights.  Thus, 
as in the context of water rights, cyber is certainly anchored in 
property rights to be part of the cyber stream.  As Tallinn 2.0 points 
out, cyber infrastructure is physical and under the territorial 
jurisdiction of States.248  In the same way, in the water context, there 
is physical infrastructure linking a parcel of land to water.249  
Further, in both contexts, this infrastructure implies a right to the 
use of a flow of the common pooled resource.  In the water context, 
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the flow is access to a flow of ground water or flow from the 
irrigation system when one’s turn in the rotation arrived.250  In the 
cyber context, the right is one to access to connectivity and 
information.  
Despite these property rights anchoring cyber in public and/or 
private ownership, cyber remains a commons in two respects.  First, 
what gives cyber value is precisely that it is a shared resource.  The 
point of cyber, its very definition, is global connectivity.251  Second, 
cyber only works if it is diligently maintained by all of the global 
participants.252 
In both respects, cyber is like the Zanjeras in the water context.253  
If the irrigation works are not maintained, the Zanjera farmers do not 
receive access to water.254  This means that the Zanjera farmers rely 
upon others doing their part in maintaining irrigation works in 
order to receive the benefit they seek.255 
This is also the case in the cyber context.  In order to have the 
benefit of the cyberspace we expect every time we go online, the 
entire global cyber-infrastructure must be maintained and kept in 
good repair.256  This means that every daily user of cyber, much like 
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the Zanjera farmer, relies upon the work of others beyond his or her 
own control to make sure those crucial flows reach him or her.  And 
every State relies upon the work of other States and other platforms, 
protocols, and operating systems.257  Cyber only works together.  
Cyber is a common pooled resource, and cyberspace is a 
commons because no one person, or even one group of persons, can 
build cyberspace alone.  Imagine building Instagram with only your 
high school friends, LinkedIn with only your current work 
colleagues, and TikTok with only your law school classmates.  
Imagine an internet without PayPal, eBay, Amazon, or Google.  
Imagine a moot court competition or law journal symposium 
without Westlaw, interactive maps, or UberEats.  It is not the same 
thing.  And you do not have to imagine this.  All you have to do is 
ask—is the carefully curated internet in the People’s Republic of 
China or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea the internet?258  
And are people in the People’s Republics the better off for the 
curating?  Just look at the streets of Hong Kong, and you will have 
the answer.259  
c. Governing the Commons 
This leaves the question of how to govern cyber as a commons.  
The remainder of this Article will outline such an approach based 
on a general nuisance principle.  Before launching into that 
discussion, however, a few guideposts from the commons literature 
are needed to guide the discussion. 
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The first point concerns the role of law.  Law can function as a 
set of textual rules to apply in a court-like setting.260  Criminal law 
might function much in this way.  But cyber is not a domain where 
law could be applied with such a precision due to the lack of state 
practice and normative consensus on cyber questions.261  Rather, law 
is a tool to guide decision-making rather than to compel it.262 
This feature of law is amplified in the commons governance 
context.  The California groundwater commons example is 
instructive.263  The courts in that context were inadequate to resolve 
the growing commons crisis on their own.264  Litigation was too 
slow, too expensive, and ultimately too unpredictable to serve as a 
cure-all for the groundwater crisis.265  Rather, commons governance 
came as a negotiated agreement, negotiated bit by bit in a trust 
building exercise.266  
But to conclude that law—and courts—had no role to play 
would significantly underestimate the role of law in commons 
governance.  Quite to the contrary, law and legal processes 
supported decision-making at every step of the way by framing the 
question in terms of equitable use.267  Further, the courts provided a 
means to enforce negotiated agreements as consent decrees.268  Law 
was thus instrumental in bringing commons governance to a 
successful outcome by empowering commons actors to 
communicate with each other in an idiom capable of reaching 
common ground and sustainable solutions. 
The California story already hints at another feature of commons 
governance:  it takes all kinds of actors to make it work.269  This 
approach to governance drawing in public and private actors and 
hybrid institutions combining both private and public functions is 
known as “polycentric” governance.270  The term “polycentric” 
governance describes an arrangement which “[i]nstead of relying 
strictly on hierarchical relations, as within a single firm . . . is 
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governed by negotiation and bargaining processes among many 
different actors in several different arenas.”271  These processes, in 
turn, interact with each other to diffuse the ultimate decision-
making authority from a single place of central power to the entire 
network of participants.272 
As this description already suggests, it is a governance model 
that can be and has been applied to cyber.  It has been applied to a 
discussion of cyber security.273  Similar structures are in place to 
govern the development of internet code itself.274  Commons 
governance, in other words, is already part and parcel of cyber 
governance regimes even if the legal processes needed to support 
them remain in shadow. 
A key to the success of polycentric governance is to move away 
from fault and towards cooperative trust-building.  The point of 
commons governance is not to blame someone when something has 
gone wrong.  It is to prevent things from going wrong in the first 
place.  For this reason, commons governance is particularly 
successful when infraction rates are low and punishment of 
infractions is not draconian but graduated, and thus not the 
principal deterrent.275  Rather, the principal deterrent from 
infracting is the violation of trust—and inherent threat of loss of 
one’s own share of the common pooled resource.276 
This feature of commons governance has two key takeaways for 
the law needed to support it.  First, the law, too, must move away 
from a fault-based approach and create a language in which shared 
use can take over as the principal governance paradigm.  Law must 
facilitate rather than prohibit, communicate rather than command, 
support rather than judge, for commons governance to succeed.  
And it must remain flexible when called upon to actually resolve a 
dispute, so as not to disincentivize future shared use by over-
punishing infractions in its own right, and thereby contributing to 
an erosion of trust and continued cooperation. 
Second, trust is good.  Trust-but-verify is better.  Successful 
commons governance approaches always involve a form of mutual 
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monitoring.277  And this mutual monitoring is the most successful 
when it is done by people interacting with each other on a frequent 
and close basis.278  Neighbors watching neighbors is a powerful 
incentive to act consistently with neighborhood standards for all 
involved.279  Such monitoring works because the person monitoring 
will herself have to live with the rules she applies to others—the 
person monitoring will in turn be monitored by the very people he 
or she called out for an infraction.  But if a person respected for 
“walking the walk” in the community could call out a person for an 
infraction, the loss of communal standing is a powerful disincentive 
for defecting from the commons governance paradigm in the first 
place. 
This second takeaway from commons governance suggests that 
the law should always look to build communities that in turn will 
help to govern up.  Neighbors should monitor neighbors.  But they 
should do so not to gain a petty advantage that hurts the commons 
in the long run and thus govern down.  They should do so in a 
manner that protects the sustainability of shared use.  The way to 
achieve this second goal is again to look to polycentricity.  A 
hierarchical system can reward “collaborators” who seek personal 
gain to the detriment of the common good.  A polycentric 
governance process that subjects all to reciprocal obligations and 
enforcement is less susceptible to such incentives. 
V. CYBER-NUISANCE 
This Article proposes that the best way to institute a commons-
based paradigm of cyber governance is to embed a principle of cyber 
nuisance in cyber governance decision-making.  This part first 
defines what general principles are in section A.  Section B then 
establishes the existence of such a nuisance principle for governance 
of correlative rights.  Section C subsequently discusses how this 
principle would function in the cyber context. 
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a. A Return to Principles 
General principles are an overlooked source of international law.  
The discussion in Tallinn 2.0 focuses on customary international 
law, application of international treaty norms by analogy, and the 
translation of potentially applicable international law norms drawn 
from other areas of international law.280  Yet, it reasonably neglects 
general principles of law. 
This neglect is understandable to a point.  General principles of 
law are frequently treated with mild derision by international law 
academics.  One went as far as suggesting that general principles are 
nothing but platitudes translated to Latin.281  Further, general 
principles of law are reasonably far away from “positive” 
expressions of the will of State on the international stage.  To use 
them therefore has an air of unwelcome natural law indulgence.282 
That being said, general principles of law formally are co-equal 
sources of international law alongside treaties and custom.283  They 
were included in the source of international law precisely to deal 
with situations in which no existing customary rule or treaty rule 
clearly resolves a given problem.284  The point of general principles 
is to provide means to avoid a conclusion that there is no 
international law governing a particular problem.285  As this is 
precisely the situation in which cyber currently finds itself, it would 
be prudent, given the structure of the sources of international law, 
to consult them. 
The snark-filled remark that general principles of law are 
platitudes turned Latin similarly should be no reason to ignore 
them.286  It is certainly true that many general principles have Latin 
names.287  It is similarly true that many of them appear to express 
platitudes (think ex iniuria non oritur ius—which flippantly could be 
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translated as “a wrong can’t make a right”).288  But that does not 
mean that these principles are not helpful in a pinch.  Just think how 
many times sophisticated lawyers refer to estoppel and “a wrong 
can’t make a right” will appear somewhat less absurd a proposition 
to rely upon in legal argument.289 
That is not to say that the proof of a general principles is always 
easy.  Quite to the contrary, it is treacherous.  Proof of a general 
principle requires one to establish that a representative set of 
relevant legal systems would address a core problem in a similar 
way.290  This means that it is not enough to look in a Restatement or 
Code.  Some legal systems have the exact same rule—sometimes 
verbatim—on the books but apply them differently.291  Others do not 
appear to have the same rule on the books at all but reach similar 
results in practice all the same.292  One therefore has to examine how 
the law works in practice.  The method to do so is known as 
functional legal comparison.293  And it is by far the best suited to 
establish a general principle. 
The benefit of general principles of law established on the basis 
of functional legal comparison is that they can find application 
beyond international law.  General principles of law established on 
the basis of functional comparison also form part and parcel of 
transnational law.294  Transnational law is, at a minimum, a material 
source of law for global business transactions.295  Principles drawn 
from transnational law are habitually applied in international 
commercial arbitration.296 
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A great deal of transactions related to cyber governance are 
currently resolved in international commercial arbitration.297  These 
proceedings, too, frequently rely upon a kind of transnational law.  
Fitting existing stereotypes, this particular field of transnational law 
gave itself a Latin name—the lex digitalis.298 
A general principle of law on cyber security drawn from private 
law stands a good chance to integrate both into public international 
law and the amorphous world of the lex digitalis.  It thus would be a 
candidate that could live up to the promise of commons governance 
through polycentricity.  Or, to put it in English, it would have the 
benefit of coordinating State-based and non-State based global 
approaches to cyber governance and thus would be able to build a 
legal bridge where one is sorely needed. 
So far, the appeal to general principles underlying this Article 
has been largely formal:  general principles are a formal source of 
international law and a material source of transnational law, so we 
should consult them.  One therefore might ask:  why is it a good idea 
functionally to consider general principles?  To answer this 
question, consider why one looks for a legal decision-making matrix 
as opposed to, say, an ideological one.  The premise of this Article 
has been that lawless spaces are inherently undesirable and that one 
should strive to provide legal tools for decision-making no matter 
what.  It is in good company in doing so.299 
The reason for this insistence is that law does a particularly good 
job, all things considered, to weigh conflicting values and balance 
countervailing interests in an even-handed and predictable 
manner.300  While legal solutions may not always be fair, they are 
always identifiably similar in the way they resolve value conflicts.301  
Or, to put this in more practical terms, one will always know when 
“the lawyers got involved” even if one does not know the law of a 
particular jurisdiction. 
The reason to appeal to general principles is that general 
principles help draw up a kind of grammar or map for legal 
 
 297 See ICANN Programs, INT‘L CENT. FOR DISP. RESOL. (2021), 
https://www.icdr.org/icann [https://perma.cc/ZMT2-FGXK]. 
 298 Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 AN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 247 (2009) 
[hereinafter Michaels, Pluralism]. 
 299 REISMAN, supra note 152152, at 21; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 284284, at 93. 
 300 See REISMAN, supra note 152152, at 185 (noting the need for an eclectic legal 
method). 
 301 See REISMAN, supra note 152152, at 185. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
1050 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:4 
decision-making in general.302  They show what kind of values are 
involved and how these values could be balanced against each 
other.  The fact that disparate legal systems arrive at a broadly 
similar way of balancing value conflicts is helpful no matter the 
formal force of general principles in their own right.  It suggests that 
to weigh differently risks losing sight of, or underplays, a value 
otherwise held in higher regard by legal decision-making.303  Any 
such cognitive dissonance in the law (or dare one say, false 
consciousness) should give one pause whether a particular 
prescription is chosen for its expedience to resolve a particular 
problem in one’s perceived favor.304  In short, if one strives to uphold 
the rule of law, one should take law seriously.  Disregarding general 
principles is a poor way to do so. 
This leaves the question which legal system to examine.  Space 
constraints—or more to the point, the attention span of the reader—
counsel against a universal comparative exercise.  This Article, and 
the project of which it forms a part, suggest that one way to narrow 
down the legal systems to include in a study is to look to States that 
have a particular role to play in cyber and cyber operations.305  If 
these States hail from diverse legal systems and socio-economic 
experience, the choice would have both relevance to the problem to 
be solved (how do I convince a lawyer from X that what we are 
doing is wrong?) and represent the significant diversity of legal 
systems of the world.  This Article therefore has chosen to examine 
the laws of the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the 
People’s Republic of China, Israel, and shari’a. 
This formally leaves two continents out of the study:  much of 
Africa and South America.  As there is no State that would easily fit 
the criteria chosen to pick legal systems, the Article has chosen not 
to study a specific jurisdiction from these continents in their own 
right.  It will, however, note where representative jurisdictions from 
these continents follow a similar path to resolving the underlying 
problem while keeping an eye on the jurisdictions which, for good 
or ill, are most closely aligned with cyber operations and thus most 
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immediately are called upon to step up their involvement in global 
cyber governance. 
b. Nuisance, Correlative Rights, and Cyber-Governance 
The concept of commons governance is firmly established in all 
of the legal systems studied.  What is more, the concept of commons 
governance follows broadly on what common lawyers would 
consider the logic of nuisance.  The nuisance principle—as it 
develops in this section—looks to restrain unreasonable overuse 
through a protection of correlative rights.  It does so without falling 
into a fault-based paradigm.  It further provides carefully calibrated 
incentives to cooperate in use and respect the reasonable correlative 
rights of one’s neighbors.  In short, nuisance is a principle that meets 
the requirements of commons governance well. 
The key to nuisance is that it is not only a principle that can guide 
decision-making, though it is that too.306  It is also a principle that 
can lead to the assertion of a cause of action.307  Thus, it is not just a 
means to think about factors impacting decision-making, it is also a 
means to police this decision-making at the margins.  It thus 
provides an additional incentive for decision makers to act in a 
manner consistent with the sustainability of the commons as a 
failure to do so could, in the right circumstances, become actionable. 
Nuisance finally exhibits key features to support polycentric 
governance.308  As discussed below, nuisance and correlative rights 
always look to neighborhood standards in one form or another.  The 
first imperative of nuisance is common use protection, the 
enforcement of correlative rights.  But precisely how this imperative 
is met is defined by context as the rights of each are correlative to 
those of the others in the commons.  Nuisance, in other words, 
respects and enforces the self-regulatory equilibria reached in a 
particular community.  It does not seek to displace them. 
Further, nuisance as a general principle has the benefit of being 
seamlessly enforceable.  A principle of cyber-nuisance would be a 
general principle of international law.  As such, it is a principle that 
 
 306 See REISMAN, supra note 152, at 183-90 (discussing the contextual-policy 
based mode of international law). 
 307 See Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 588, 605, 
607 (Tex. 2016); Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada) 1938/1941, R.I.A.A. 1905. 
 308 See OSTROM DIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 281-86. 
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should govern the decision-making of States.309  But it is more than 
just a general principle of international law.  It is also a general 
principle of transnational law—that is, a general principle of private 
law that is enforceable in international commerce.310  This, too, 
supports the polycentric nature of commons governance.311  Rather 
than capturing only a principle exclusive to State concerns in cyber, 
the same principle also guides corporate concerns.  Given the power 
of apex platforms, operating systems, and infrastructure companies, 
this expansion of the scope of application of the principle means that 
these actors are finally brought into the fold.  Not only that, but a 
failure by these actors to take commons concerns into consideration 
in making their own business decisions would provide a ready 
cause of action—and not just for the business partners of these 
companies in transnational commerce.  Rather, cyber-nuisance, once 
fully adopted, provides a ready domestic means for affected parties 
to cause compliance by private actors no matter where they might 
be located. 
i. United States 
Restatement (Second) of Torts is the classic statement of 
nuisance law in the United States.312  The Restatement distinguishes 
between private and public nuisance.313  The Restatement defines a 
private nuisance as conduct, whether intentional and unreasonable 
or otherwise negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous, which 
legally causes the invasion of another’s interest in land.314  A 
nuisance can arise out of either an action or an omission.315  The 
Restatement provides that a failure to act constitutes a nuisance if 
there is some positive duty to “prevent or abate the interference with 
the public interest or the invasion of the private interest.”316 
 
 309 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 284284, at 93. 
 310 KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX 
MERCATORIA 202 (2d ed. 2010). 
 311 OSTROM DIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 281-86. 
 312 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (AM. LAW. INST. 1979). I will refer to it as 
the “Restatement” in the text from here on out for ease of reference. 
 313 Id. at § 821. 
 314 Id. at § 822. 
 315 Id. at § 824. 
 316 Id. at § 824(b). 
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The Restatement further treats as intentional an interference or 
invasion, which the perpetrator “knows [will result] or is 
substantially certain to result from his conduct.”317  To constitute a 
nuisance, such intentional interference or invasion must be 
“unreasonable.”318  To determine if it is unreasonable, the 
Restatement weighs the gravity of the harm against the utility of the 
conduct, looking to the respective social benefits of the interests 
involved and the extent and character of the harm and conduct.319 
The Restatement defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable 
interference with a right common to the general public.”320 The 
Restatement explains in the comments that “[a] public right is one 
common to all members of the general public” and that the right “is 
collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone 
has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently 
injured.”321  The Restatement cites water pollution as a key example 
of such a public right.322  The Restatement then again uses a 
multifactor test to weigh whether the interference with the public 
right is unreasonable.323  Importantly, these factors look to public 
safety and public peace.324  They further consider “whether the 
conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or 
long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, 
has a significant effect upon the public right.”325 
So far, the Restatement approach to private nuisance at least 
appears to take a fault-based approach.  That is, the Restatement 
suggests that one must prove either negligence (and as such tortious 
in its own right) or intentional endangerment.326  This impression 
however is misleading. 
Particularly, as a brilliant study by Professor Jill Fraley has 
shown, state courts do not follow this tort-based approach to 
nuisance but rather anchor nuisance in property law and the right 
 
 317 Id. at § 825(b). 
 318 Id. 312at § 822. 
 319 Id. at §§ 826-28. 
 320 Id. at § 821B. 
 321 Id. at § 821B, cmt. g. 
 322 Id.  
 323 Id. at § 821B(2). 
 324 Id. 312at § 821B(2)(a). 
 325 Id. at § 821B(2)(c). 
 326 Id. at § 822. 
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to exclude.327  As Professor Fraley explains, “few courts have 
adopted this switch in the intent requirement for nuisance.”328  
Instead, “a larger number of states by far maintain the traditional 
position, which extends liability for nuisance beyond acts that are 
intentional or negligent to interferences more generally, regardless 
of the conduct of the defendant.”329 
What Professor Fraley correctly recognizes is that nuisance 
critically goes to the right to exclude others from property.330  From 
a property perspective, nuisance is a claim which lies for the 
unreasonable interference with enjoyment of property rights that is 
not a trespass.331  The key to understanding this dominant 
understanding of nuisance in the courts is that liability is not strict—
rather, it focuses on the reasonableness of the interference.332 
To put another way, nuisance properly construed is a claim that 
lies in the context of the undue interference with correlative rights.333  
Correlative rights exist when multiple people have rights to a 
common pool resource.334  These correlative rights are negative 
rights:  they impose a duty on each user of the common pool 
resource to act so as not to destroy the entitlement of another user.335  
 
 327 See Jill M. Fraley, Liability for Unintentional Nuisances: How the Restatement 
of Torts Almost Negligently Killed the Right to Exclude in Property Law, 121 W. VA. L. 
REV. 419, 451 (2018) (“[N]uisance is quintessentially about property, not about tort. 
The primary function of nuisance law is to limit the normally rather unlimited 
freedom that a property owner has to use her land as she likes.”). 
 328 Id. at 421. 
 329 Id. at 422. 
 330 Id. at 423. 
 331 Id. at 453; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property in the Law of Nuisance, 90 
VA. L. REV. 965, 992-6 (2004). 
 332 See Fraley, supra note 327, at 456 (“Subsets of nuisance law were strict . . . . 
Outside those subsets, however, nuisance law was not unlimited.”); see also Smith, 
supra note 331, at 992 (“Under more modern approaches to nuisance, balancing tests 
are often invoked at the liability or remedy stage”). 
 333 See Bradford W. Wyche, A Guide to the Common Law of Nuisance in South 
Carolina, 45 S.C.L. REV. 337, 357 (1994) (“Similarly, in Young v. Brown, the court 
stated that ‘due regard must be had to the correlative rights of the parties’ in 
determining whether an activity should be declared a private nuisance” (quoting 
212 S.C. 156, 169 (1948)); but see Tara K. Righetti, Correlative Rights and Limited 
Common Property in the Pore Space: A Response to the Challenge of Subsurface Trespass 
in Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10420, 10431-
32 (2017) (discussing the dangers of watering down trespass with a Restatement 
version of nuisance). 
 334 Pierce, supra note 36, at 245-46. 
 335 Pierce, supra note 36, at 246. 
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But correlative rights also give users a positive right to access and 
enjoyment of the common pool resource.336 
One common example of correlative rights is the situation in 
which multiple lessees produce oil and gas under multiple distinct 
leases from a single formation.337  Correlative rights here have two 
parts: (1) the right to produce from, and duty to preserve, the 
integrity of the reservoir; and (2) the right to, and duty not to 
interfere with, a reasonable portion of the common pooled 
resource.338 
The interference with a correlative right could be actionable in 
trespass.339  Yet, this trespass logic has been receding.340  Rather, the 
focus more appropriately is on the loss of one’s own right to use by 
another’s use of the correlative share of a common pool resource.341 
This focus now again sounds peculiarly like nuisance construed 
as a property law concept.  The interference with correlative rights 
frequently is not a trespass for the reasons outlined by Professor 
David Pierce in his seminal work on oil and gas rights.342  This leaves 
the question whether it is an actionable infringement of the right to 
a common pooled resource under the second string of “trespass or 
nuisance.”343  The main objection developed to such a classification 
advanced by Professor Pierce is that “nuisance is a tort remedy to 
protect property; it does not define the property itself.”344  
Correlative rights, on the other hand, do so define the property.345  
This much of course is true. 
 
 336 Pierce, supra note 36, at 246. 
 337 Pierce, supra note 36, at 246, 253-255. 
 338 Pierce, supra note 36, at 256. 
 339 Pierce, supra note 36, at 259-64. 
 340 See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 4 
(Tex. 2008) (holding “the rule of capture bars recovery” of any damages that may 
have been available under a trespass approach).  For a discussion of the case, see 
Theresa D. Poindexter, Correlative Rights Doctrine, Not the Rule of Capture, Provides 
Correct Analysis for Resolving Hydraulic Fracturing Cases [Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008)], 48 WASHBURN L.J. 755, 756 (2009) (“By 
failing to analyze trespass, the court did not properly apply the rule of capture”). 
 341 Pierce, supra note 36, at 259-64. 
 342 Pierce, supra note 36, at 259-64. 
 343 Colleen E. Lamarre, Owning the Center of the Earth: Hydraulic Fracturing and 
Subsurface Trespass in the Marcellus Shale Region, 21 CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL’Y 457, 478-
79 (2011) (discussing Jameson v. Ethyl Corp., 609 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Ark. 1980)). 
 344 David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas 
Development by Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. REV. 759, 768 (2009). 
 345 Id. 
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The point remains however that the interference with the right to 
access a commons, once that right has been defined, is a nuisance.  If 
there is no right without a remedy, nuisance thus has a significant 
role to play in defining correlative rights.346  This is so in jurisdictions 
that do not follow Restatement, as Fraley has correctly explained.347  
In those jurisdictions, nuisance has begun balancing the relative 
rights of users against each other and thus to bring in force the best 
approximation of their reasonable use rights from the common pool 
resource.348 
Even in jurisdictions like Texas that more closely follow the 
Restatement approach, however, Professor Pierce’s observation 
makes the substantial interference with a correlative right 
remediable as a nuisance.  Per Crosstex North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. 
Gardiner, nuisance at Texas law is a “legal injury involving 
interference with the use and enjoyment of real property.”349  
Crosstex further established that the interference must be substantial 
to rise to the level of a nuisance.350  The cause of action to recover for 
such nuisance in Texas requires showing of intent (intent to harm or 
substantial certainty of harm) or negligence (duty, breach, causation, 
harm).351  The allegation that a person violated correlative rights 
provides the predicate for such a claim:  correlative rights are 
negative rights and create a legal duty the breach of which would 
satisfy the negligence prong.352  If the breach causes substantial 
interference with the enjoyment of correlative rights, it can thus be 
remedied as a nuisance.  This correlative right cause of action 
seeking to remedy a nuisance then even under Texas law returns to 
its property roots:  it could benefit from an injunction as opposed to 
mere money damages.353 
This distinction between trespass and nuisance makes a 
difference.  Another Texas case currently making waves, Lightning 
 
 346 Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable 
Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1426 (2015) (“The Supreme Court has not been 
completely faithful to no right without a remedy.”). 
 347 Fraley, supra note 327, at 423. 
 348 Fraley, supra note 327, at 457-58. 
 349 Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 588. 
 350 Id. at 595. 
 351 Id. at 605, 607. 
 352 Pierce, supra note 36, at 245-46. 
 353 Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 610. 
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Oil v. Anadarko E&P Offshore, illustrates why.354  The case involved 
facts typically seen only on a Property law exam:  Lightning Oil held 
a lease to produce oil and gas from the owner of the relevant mineral 
estate.355  Anadarko meanwhile sought and received the right from 
the surface owner to drill across the land to access minerals adjacent 
to Lightning’s lease.356  Lightning Oil objected to Anadarko’s activity 
as inconsistent with Lightning Oil’s rights under the lease.357  
Anadarko offered to move its drill site and Lightning Oil made clear 
that it would object to any drilling activity by Anadarko.358  
Lightning Oil eventually claimed for trespass and tortious 
interference with contract.359 
The Texas Supreme Court rejected both claims.360  In focusing its 
analysis on the relationship of the surface estate and the mineral 
estate, the court placed them in a position that eerily looks like 
correlative rights.361  Then comes the key passage:  “an unauthorized 
interference with the place where the minerals are located constitutes 
a trespass as to the mineral estate only if the interference infringes 
on the mineral lessee’s ability to exercise its rights.”362  In context, 
this is no longer a trespass.  The Lightning Oil court treated the 
question as one of nuisance akin to Crosstex—it required a non-
trifling interference with the exercise, that is, enjoyment, of a right as 
opposed to any infringement of an absolute right.363  Finding no 
interference with the use right, the Lightning court dismissed.364  To 
predict future holdings post-Lightning, the correlative rights and 
nuisance approach is more likely to hit on the concerns raised in 
Lightning than the trespass jurisprudence would:  to satisfy Texas 
 
 354 Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Offshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 
2017). 
 355 Id. at 43. 
 356 Id. 
 357 Id. 
 358 Id. 
 359 Id. 
 360 Id. at 53. 
 361 Id. at 48-49. 
 362 Id. at 49. 
 363 Compare Lightning Oil Co., 520 S.W.3d at 48-9 (seeking to square its analysis 
with the near absolute nature of the rights of the mineral estate as dominant estate), 
with Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 595 (requiring non-trifling interference with use for 
nuisance). 
 364 Lightning Oil, 520 S.W.3d at 53. 
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courts to intervene, one must prove a substantial impairment of 
one’s use as opposed to a theoretical one.365 
This logic extends further.  Thus, one of the key remedies for a 
nuisance is abatement of the nuisance (its removal) and may involve 
self-help to bring it about.366  This concept was further expanded in 
a commons-oriented fashion.  In Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb 
Development Co. the Supreme Court of Arizona was called upon to 
resolve the classic coming-to-the-nuisance case.367  A real estate 
developer began developing a sub-division next to a feedlot.368  The 
feedlot (predictably) emitted smells not to the liking of potential 
buyers in the subdivision.369  The developer asserted a nuisance 
claim, relying particularly on the fact that the feedlot operator did 
not comply with health and safety ordinances by permitting 
conditions on its property that “constitutes a breeding place for flies, 
rodents, mosquitoes and other insects.”370  The feedlot owner 
defended on the basis that the developer had come to the 
nuisance.371 
The case is interesting for its ultimate resolution of the dispute.  
The feedlot had to move.372  This can easily be reconciled with the 
tort and fault-based conception of nuisance in the Restatement.373  
What cannot be reconciled with such a perspective is that the court 
also ordered the developer to pay for the move.374  The ostensible 
victim of the nuisance had to pay for the removal of the nuisance.375  
This is not consistent with a fault-based understanding as the 
wrongdoer is not typically compensated to desist from their 
 
 365 For a full treatment of the question of subsurface rights in U.S. common 
law through the nuisance lens, see Joseph A. Schremmer, Getting Past Possession: 
Subsurface Property Disputes as Nuisance, 95 WASH. L. REV. 315, passim (2020).  For its 
discussion of Lightning Oil Co., see id. at 361-64. 
 366 Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 610. 
 367 Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 
1972). 
 368 Id. at 705. 
 369 Id. 
 370 Id. at 706 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-601). 
 371 Id. at 706-07. 
 372 Id. at 708. 
 373 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1979). 
 374 Spur Industries, 494 P.2d at 708. 
 375 Id. 
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wrongdoing.376  Nuisance cannot be fault based if it can require 
contribution from the person seeking to enjoy their right to be put in 
a position to enjoy it. 
But such a result is perfectly consistent with a commons 
rationale of nuisance as protecting the correlative rights of users of 
a commons.  Maintenance of the commons requires contributions 
from all participants in the commons.377  To demand one’s right of 
access therefore also means that one must be willing to contribute to 
the maintenance of the commons.  When such maintenance requires 
others to incur expenses, all must reasonably participate in them.  
Claiming a right to the commons is neither self-centered nor is it 
free.  It is communal, and it is earned. 
ii. France 
As a quintessential civil law jurisdiction, France approaches the 
question of nuisance in a manner that is both startlingly different 
from and startlingly similar to U.S. law.  The civil law tradition 
derives from and is a “reception of” the Roman law.378  One of the 
most authoritative restatements of Classical Roman law is the Digest 
of Justinian.379  The Digest of Justinian provides in relevant part that 
“every person may act as he pleases on his own property, so long as 
he immits [sic] nothing on the property of another.”380  This proviso 
provides the foothold for a conception of correlative rights in Roman 
law. 
This Roman law principle was received in French law in terms 
of the “droits de voisinage,” “troubles de voisinange,” or “neighbors’ 
rights.  France exported its conception of trouble de voisinage in one 
 
 376 The Court sought to avoid this conclusion by stating that the victims were 
the customers of the plaintiff and not the plaintiff and moving on an ostensible basis 
of comparative fault.  Id.  This rationale is difficult to maintain given that the Court 
ruled that the plaintiff had standing and the victims on whose behalf the Court 
appeared to act did not appear in the proceedings.  Id. at 706. 
 377 See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 2, at 82-7 (discussing early irrigation 
communities in the Philippines). 
 378 Leon E. Trakman, “Legal Traditions” and International Commercial 
Arbitration, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 5 (2006). 
 379 Id. 
 380 Zigurds L. Zile, Judicial Control of Land Use in France, 45 CORNELL L. REV. 
288, 289 (1960) (translating Digest 8.5.8, § 5). 
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form or another to other jurisdictions.  For example, the concept was 
incorporated in Senegalese civil law.381 
These neighbors’ rights on their face differ markedly from 
nuisance.382  Nuisance distinguishes between public and private 
nuisance.  Neighbors’ rights deem that public nuisance is a question 
for administrative regulation as opposed to civil law rights.383  
Claims of public nuisance would have to be brought to “the 
authorities” as opposed to the courts.384  All one could claim for, on 
its face, would be private nuisance and the private harm suffered by 
a neighbor as opposed to the harm done to the community.385 
At the same time, neighbors’ rights are startlingly similar to the 
law of nuisance.  For one, neighbor’s rights sit at the uneasy 
intersection of property law and the law of obligations, particularly 
delict (or tort).386  Problematically, French civil law was historically 
incomplete and did not deal with the emission of gases, odors, noise, 
or vibrations from one property to the property of the neighbor.387  
This area of law therefore was developed by combining concepts 
from the right to exclude and the right of enjoyment in the law of 
property with the general delictual or tort principles that intentional 
or negligent conduct causing harm to another requires the payment 
of compensation.388  This combination of areas of law permits French 
judges to enjoin fruitful and lawful use of land that is nevertheless 
unduly disruptive to the user’s neighbors.389 
French law is functionally similar to U.S. nuisance law and the 
law of correlative rights.  It requires a showing of the invasion of 
 
 381 See André Tunc, La responsabilité civile dans trois récentes codifications 
africaines, 19 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 927, 931 (1967); see also 
DIDIER MARTIN, DROIT CIVIL ET COMMERCIAL SENEGALAIS 103-04 (1982) ; Ibrahima Ly 
& Papa Meissa Dieng, Le Senegal, in LA MISE EN OEUVRE NATIONALE DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT DANS LES PAYS FRANCOPHONES  389, 399 (Michel 
Prieur ed., 2003). 
 382 See Vanessa Casado Perez & Carlos Gomez Liguerre, From Nuisance to 
Environmental Protection in Continental Europe, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1010-11 (2019) 
(for a comparative analysis). 
 383 Zile, supra note 380, at 294. 
 384 Zile, supra note 380, at 294. 
 385 Zile, supra note 380, at 294. 
 386 Zile, supra note 380, at 294. 
 387 Zile, supra note 380, at 294.; Casado, supra note 382, at 1010-11. 
 388 Zile, supra note 380, at 297-8. 
 389 ANNIE CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, DROIT DES BIENS 167 (2d ed. 2007). 
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another’s property right.390  It further conceived of this invasion as 
coming from the use of a property right.391  In short, it was an action 
that was as much in rem—about the land or lands involved—as it 
was in personam—about the owner of the land.  This echoes 
American nuisance.392  Similarly, it requires a showing of abuse of 
right.393  This also mirrors American nuisance.394  Finally, both 
require a showing of causation.395 
The French understanding of abuse of right is particularly 
helpful to show the striking functional similarities between 
American nuisance and French neighbor’s rights.  An abuse of rights 
is the exercise of a right in a manner that is ultimately unreasonably 
destructive of the interests of another.396  “Unreasonably 
destructive” here can be understood as disproportionately 
disruptive.  This disproportion is then measured against 
neighborhood standards to determine whether the use of the land in 
question is normal or abusive.397 
But it can also be understood as disruptive of the right of a 
neighbor to access to a commons or quasi commons.  Specifically, 
the French law of neighborhood rights is historically concerned with 
rights to groundwater.  In the neighborhood right context, early 
cases such as Badoit v. André or Forissier v. Chaverot stood for the 
proposition that groundwater rights are treated as a resource that 
cannot be unreasonably captured by any one person due to an 
absolute ownership claim—water does not belong to any one 
person.398  Rather, in these historical cases, water may only be 
reasonably exploited or enjoyed by all who share in the reservoir.399  
French law here grappled with the same problem as the correlative 
rights and commons problem in U.S. law. 
 
 390 Zile, supra note 380, at 297-98; CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 
166-73. 
 391 Zile, supra note 380, at 297-98; CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 
166-73. 
 392 Spur Industries, 494 P.2d at 708. 
 393 Zile, supra note 380, at 297-98, 302-09; Casado, supra note 382, at 1010-11. 
 394 Wyche, supra note 333, at 357. 
 395 Restat. 2d, supra note 312, at § 822. 
 396 Zile, supra note 380, at 299-302. 
 397 CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167-69. 
 398 Badoit v. André, Lyon, 18 avril 1856, D.P. [1856] 2. 199; Forissier v. Chaverot, 
Req., 10 juin 1902, D.P. [1902] 1. 454; see also Zile, supra note 380, at 299 (discussing 
both cases). 
 399 See Zile, supra note 380, at 299. 
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Similarly, in a modern setting, French neighbors’ rights concern 
such resources as access to sunlight, quiet enjoyment, freedom from 
noxious smells, and a clean environment.400  These resources, too, 
are characteristic of a commons.  We all need them to thrive.  We all 
share in them.  And yet, no one person owns them as such.  Nor has 
even the most totalitarian of governments nationalized or 
collectivized the air we breathe. 
This understanding of the French law of neighbor’s rights as 
maintaining the commons can explain a startling problem in French 
law.  A judge establishes a violation of neighborhood rights based 
on the “abnormal character of the interference.”401  But, as a French 
property law hornbook makes clear, “a decision which would 
require proof of fault by the author of the interference would be 
commit an error of law.”402  How then could conduct be both abusive 
and not blameworthy at the same time? 
The correlative-rights rationale provides an answer.  The “over-
enjoyment” of a commons, taken to an extreme, threatens the 
commons itself.  Such over-enjoyment sets the stage for the famous 
tragedy of the commons of collective unsustainable use.403  It is 
abnormal and abusive in the sense that it is unsustainable.404 
And yet, it is precisely what makes the tragedy of the commons 
tragic that blaming the participants for their individual overuse of 
the commons is as misguided as it is pointless.405  This individual 
overuse is an understandable and rational response to structural 
incentives to take while something is still available to be taken.406  
This response is understandable and not blameworthy because the 
abstention of each individual user of the commons alone would only 
inflict a double loss on that individual—loss of use of the commons 
now relative to other users of the commons and a loss of the 
commons later when the unsustainable use by others has finally 
driven the commons to extinction.407  The tragedy is structural and 
not individual.408 
 
 400 CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167-69. 
 401 CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167. 
 402 CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167. 
 403 Hardin, supra note 222. 
 404 CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167-69. 
 405 See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 178-80. 
 406 OSTROM, supra note 32, at 178-80. 
 407 OSTROM, supra note 32, at 178-80. 
 408 OSTROM, supra note 32, at 178-80. 
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The hornbook distinction between fault and abnormal use in the 
French law of neighbor’s rights captures the essence of this tragedy 
and seeks to set the structural incentives to avert it.409  It understands 
that the conduct by the person is not blameworthy.  It nevertheless 
maintains that the use of the resource is abusive and abnormal and 
as such to be enjoined to protect the commons.410 The commons 
rationale thus brings the law back to understanding of a principle of 
nuisance as between property and tort/delict, between in personam 
and in rem by focusing on the structural consequences of correlative 
use of resources.411  The French commons rationale, however, is 
more protective than some U.S. jurisdictions, such as Texas, by 
allowing a cause of action for conduct, which is abnormal in its 
surroundings even if it is not ultra-hazardous.412 
Given this functional understanding of French neighbor’s rights, 
it should not come as a surprise that French law resembles the 
American concept of nuisance law in another, central respect.  Its 
main remedy, too, is abatement.413  This means that like American 
nuisance tort law, it is currently a chief means to provide private law 
remedies for pollution.414  It is thus inherently linked to 
environmental protection in its modern incarnation in the same way 
as nuisance law in America has become.415  Both are means to help 
govern the commons. 
iii. Russia 
Russian law, as a civil law jurisdiction, follows broadly in the 
same legal tradition as French law.  It is therefore unsurprising that 
Russian law follows broadly a similar starting point to French law 
in the use of property:  as a matter of “private law, the interests of 
 
 409 CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167. 
 410 CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167. 
 411 This understanding of neighbor’s rights in French law is currently in the 
process of codification.  See Casado, supra note 382, at 1011, for an English 
translation of the draft text and status of the codification process. 
 412 CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167; Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 607-
08. 
 413 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, TORTS 56 (Andre 
Tunc ed. 1981) 
 414 CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167. 
 415 See Monika Hinteregger, Environmental Liability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Emma Less & Jorge E. Viñuales, eds., 2019). 
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other persons, in particular, neighbors must be taken into 
account.”416  The key property law provision in the Code dealing 
with a question akin to nuisance is Article 304.  It states that “[a]n 
owner may demand the elimination of all violation of its rights even 
though these violations were not connected with a deprivation of 
possession.”417  There is thus a foothold for correlative rights to 
develop in Russian Law, as well. 
Article 304 of the Russian Civil Code codifies the Roman law 
“actio negatoria.”418  This “actio negatoria” is originally a Roman law 
cause of action available to an owner of land to force another to cease 
and desist from interfering with the owner’s enjoyment of his or her 
land.419  Roman law construed such interference with enjoyment as 
a servitude imposed upon the land.420  The actio negatoria sought a 
declaration of the absence of such a servitude and an injunction 
against the offending interference.421  The failure to seek such a 
declaration could itself be problematic, as a servitude could be 
imposed upon land by prescription (adverse possession).422  As one 
recent Roman law text explains, the actio negatoria therefore “served 
to defend against claims of servitudes, ‘immissions [sic]’ [i.e., the 
commissions of what at common law would be called nuisance or 
trespass], and other impairments of ownership.”423  This concept of 
actio negatoria is a typical civil law meaning to protect use rights and 
 
 416 PETER B. MAGGS, OLGA SCHWARTZ & WILLIAM BURNHAM, LAW AND LEGAL 
SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 417, 436 (2015). 
 417 GRAZHDANSKII ̆ KODEKS ROSSII ̆SKOI ̆ FEDERATSII [GK FK] [Civil Code] arts. 304 
(Russ.) (translated in PETER B. MAGGS, THE CIVIL CODE OF RUSSIA, PARTS 1 AND 2 
(2018)). 
 418 Tikhon Podshivalov, Models of Actio Negatoria in the Law of Russia and 
European Countries, 7 RU. L.J. 128, 133 (2019) 
 419 See W.W. BUCKLAND REVISED BY PETER STEIN, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 
FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 676 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the “need for this 
action”). 
 420 EUGENE PETIT, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DU DROIT ROMAIN para. 773 (1906). 
 421 Id. 
 422 See Max Radin, Fundamental Concepts of Roman Law, 13 CAL. L. REV. 207, 217 
(1925) (discussing permissibility of acquisitive prescription of servitudes in 
praetorian law); see also A. N. Yiannopoulos, Creation of Servitudes by Prescription and 
Destination of the Owner, 43 LA. L. REV. (1982) (discussing creation of servitudes by 
prescription in modern civil law). 
 423 HERBERT HAUSMANIGER & RICHARD GAMAUF, A CASEBOOK ON ROMAN 
PROPERTY LAW 205 (George A. Sheets trans. 2012). 
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is prevalent in other jurisdictions in Latin America such as Brazil, as 
well as many Eastern European jurisdictions.424 
Article 304 of the Russian Civil Code has been interpreted in 
express comparison to the common law of nuisance.425  This 
comparison is functionally apt—nuisance and actio negatoria 
regulate the same kind of correlative relationship.  It is, however, 
formally somewhat problematic because Article 304 of the Russian 
Civil Code is structurally more closely related to property law than 
it is to delictual liability.426 
This formal difference is blunted somewhat in practice.  Conduct 
that satisfies this requirement of Article 304 further arguably meets 
the requirement of quasi-delictual liability in Russian law.  
Specifically, Russian law makes available injunctions for potential 
or future interferences with the enjoyment of property as part of its 
law of delict or tort.427  This tort, too, has been analogized to the 
common law of nuisance.428  These requirements meaningfully 
overlap with, and inform the property law concept codified in 
Article 304 of the Civil Code.429 
To succeed on a claim for violation of Article 304, jurisprudence 
sets out that the claimant must prove ownership of property.430  This 
tracks the French understanding of neighbors’ rights.  Both Russian 
law and French law formally require that the interference suffered 
be a private wrong only.431  That is, in both Russian law and French 
 
 424 See Jose Isaac Pilati, Property Law, in INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN LAW at § 
5.01 (Fabilan Deffenti & Weiber Barral eds., 2016); see also Podshivalov, supra note 
418, passim. 
 425 See Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 131 (comparing actio negatoria to 
English law); see also Stanley R. Boots, Observations from Afield: The Tension Between 
the Goals of Russian Environmental Legislation and Extralegal Factors in the Russian Far 
East, 10 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 201, 234 (1998) (comparing the Russia legal system to 
U.S. environmental law). 
 426 See GRAZHDANSKII ̆ KODEKS ROSSII ̆SKOI ̆ FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] arts. 
301-304 (Russ.) (providing the immediate context for article 304). 
 427 CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE, RUSSIAN CIVIL CODE TEXT AND ANALYSIS, pts. 1-3, at 
215-16 (2008). 
 428 Id. 
 429 GRAZHDANSKII ̆ KODEKS ROSSII ̆SKOI ̆ FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 304 
(Russ.) (translated in PETER B. MAGGS, THE CIVIL CODE OF RUSSIA, pts. 1-2 (2018)). 
 430 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 142 (discussing Novosibirsk Regional Court 
Determination of 16 May 2017 in case No. 33-4705/2017). 
 431 See Asya Ostroukh, Russian Society and its Civil Codes: A Long Way to Civilian 
Civil Law, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 373, 393 (2013): 
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law, the plaintiff must have standing to bring a lawsuit and allege a 
specific harm to a specific piece of property and a specific property 
right.  Both appear to exclude a public wrong or public nuisance.432 
Further, the plaintiff must prove that he or she “does not have 
different means to freely use the object belonging to him [or her].”433  
The cause of action applies not just to physical intrusions, but also 
to deprivations of light and similar environmental harms.434 
In addition to these requirements, an action for violation of 
Article 304 also takes on elements of delictual liability much like U.S. 
nuisance and French neighborhood rights.  Specifically, the conduct 
at issue in an Article 304 violation must be “wrongful.”  As a recent 
study explains, the conduct is wrongful if it “is carried out 
arbitrarily, without authorization, without a sufficient legal 
basis.”435 
Importantly, the understanding of wrongfulness here tracks the 
French understanding of abnormal use.436  Thus, in Russian law, 
wrongfulness does not mean fault or guilt.437  This, too, was a 
hallmark of the French neighbors’ rights and its link to the 
protection of the enjoyment of the commons.438 
The quintessential protection of enjoyment at issue in Russian 
sources again indicates a close link to correlative rights.  The 
 
Nonetheless, in spite of all these restrictions, it is a private property that 
gives to its owner all the rights of possession, enjoinment, and disposition 
of property. This right is also protected by all of the means of private 
ownership known to civilian legal systems (a true revendicatory 
action/actio rei vindicatio and negatory action/actio negatoria). Vladimir 
Gsovski is correct in his statement that, “the Soviet law of property shows 
also how inescapable private ownership, although in a small dose, is, even 
in a socialist State.”  
(internal italics omitted) (quoting VLADIMIR GSOVSKI, 2 SOVIET CIVIL LAW: PRIVATE 
RIGHTS AND THEIR BACKGROUND UNDER SOVIET REGIME 567 (Univ. of Mich. L. Sch. 
Ann Arbor 1949); CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167-69. 
 432 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 142 (“[W]hen making a statement of actio 
negatoria, the claimant must prove that he has the appropriate right to an 
individually-defined object.”); CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167-69. 
 433 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 143. 
 434 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 152. 
 435 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 150. 
 436 Compare CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389389, at 167 (outlining 
French understanding of abnormal use), with Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 143 
(outlining the Russian understanding).  
 437  Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 143 (“Actio negatoria will be satisfied only 
if the wrongfulness of the actions of a third party is proved, and it does not matter 
if this behavior was guilty.”). 
 438 See infra Section II. 
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interference at issue in the Russian law conception of actio negatoria 
inherently is an interference with use of property.  It is not an action 
to quiet title—in fact, it is defined in contradistinction to such an 
action.439  Rather, it is an action to enjoin interference with 
enjoyment. 
The protection of use is a protection of a property right because 
“interfering with the ability to extract useful properties from an 
object by one’s actions automatically entails difficulty in owning 
it.”440  The protection of actio negatoria therefore applies to the over-
extraction by another of resources shared in the sense of correlative 
rights in the same way as the abuse of right rationale did in the 
French water law context.441  The actio negatoria seeks to protect the 
reasonable use of owners with interests in a shared resource. 
Two recent case examples showcase this understanding of 
Russian law.  The first, Case No. 18AP-10608/2016, concerns the 
release of wastewater by a wastewater treatment facility.442  The 
facility impaired the use of its property by a neighboring property 
owner due to contamination in violation of Russian water law.443  
The conduct was enjoined, the nuisance abated—and it was 
enjoined to protect the use of the plaintiff’s correlative right to the 
shared water supplies. 444 The defendant’s water use threatened the 
shared water rights and therefore was to be enjoined.445   Second, the 
Russian Supreme Court in 2012 applied a similar understanding to 
a more mundane and urban setting:446  the interference with the 
enjoyment of common areas in an apartment building.447  The 
protection therefore applies to access to commons or shared 
resources broadly defined. 
In sum, Russian law is broadly consistent with American and 
French law.  It concerns the protection of correlative rights in 
 
 439 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 144-45 (listing the legal characteristics of 
actio negatoria). 
 440 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 147. 
 441 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 147 (discussing Russian law); see also Badoit 
v. André Lyon, 18 avril 1856, D.P. [1856] 2. 199 (Fr.); Forissier v. Chaverot, Req., 10 juin 
1902, D.P. [1902] 1. 454 (Fr.); Zile, supra note 380, at 299 (discussing both French 
cases). 
 442 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 155. 
 443 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 155. 
 444 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 155. 
 445 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 155. 
 446 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 153 (discussing the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation of 17 February 2015 in case No. 302-ES14-1496). 
 447 Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 153. 
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commons.  Russian law polices the use of the common pooled 
resource against interferences with correlative rights.  It polices the 
use not by reference to the concept of fault.  Rather, it looks to a 
concept of wrongfulness that, like the French concept of abnormal 
use, is concerned with the sustainable use of resources. 
iv. People’s Republic of China 
Chinese law similarly recognizes a private right of action for 
nuisance.  In principle, non-trivial interferences with a property 
right can give right to a suit in nuisance.448  This principle has since 
been expanded and further defined in a concept of statutory 
nuisance.  As Professor Guiguo Wang explains, first attempts at 
codifying statutory nuisance was intended as a “bridge between the 
common law and regulations.”449  Professor Wang notes that 
“[s]tatutory nuisance was created to allow for a speedy and efficient 
way to abate nuisances without resorting to [the] complex” 
regulatory procedures.450  Chinese law has since undergone further 
reform. 
The currently most analogous provisions in Chinese law to 
nuisance are Articles 65-68 of the 2010 Chinese Tort Law.451  Article 
65 follows the general polluter-pays principle.452  It sets out that if a 
person suffering from pollution can show that they were harmed 
and that the harm was caused by the pollution, the person who 
caused the pollution will be liable to the victim.453 
Once a party has discharged its burden under Article 65, Article 
66 imposes the burdens of persuasion onto the polluter to show that 
their activity did not constitute pollution.454  Further, Article 66 
allows the polluter to claim for mitigation or to provide evidence to 
 
 448 THE CHINA LAW SERIES, LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA: MARKET ECONOMY 
AND LAW 414 (GUIGUO WANG & Wei Zhenying eds., 1996). 
 449 Id. at 420. 
 450 Id. 
 451 Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó qīnquán zérèn fǎ (中华人民共和国侵权责任
法) [Tort Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) arts. 65-68 (China), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn136en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WZL6-6XT7] (WIPO, trans.). 
 452 Id. at art. 65. 
 453 Id. at art. 66. 
 454 Id.  
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call into question the plaintiff’s causation case.455  The remaining two 
articles of Chapter VII on environmental pollution further set out a 
modified regime of joint and several liability.456 
This new 2010 regime has been likened to private nuisance.457  It 
tracks some of the features of French and Russian law and a majority 
of U.S. jurisdictions.  Specifically, the 2010 Tort Law creates a no-
fault regime.458  This no-fault regime, however, does not outright 
define what constitutes “pollution.”459  It thus does not identify 
clearly whether the pollution in question means any emissions or 
interferences or only abnormal emissions or spills.  It also does not 
list what kind of interferences will be considered pollution. 
The question as to what pollution is covered by the 2010 regime 
can meaningfully be informed by the broader public interest 
environmental lawsuits now available under Chinese law.460  This 
broader Chinese law framework permits lawsuits not just by 
persons directly harmed by pollution, as the 2010 Tort Law would.461  
It removes this standing requirement and allows public interest 
groups to bring actions for environmental harm in the courts.462 
The definition of pollution operating under this broader 
framework, as Professor Benoit Mayer and Richard Zhang explain, 
allows public interest litigation “to target not only conduct which 
pollutes the human environment, but also actions that cause 
ecological damage.”463  A systemic interpretation of Chinese law as 
a whole would suggest that the term “pollution” in the 2010 Tort 
Law follows this broader concern with pollution and would allow 
suit for any unreasonable environmental degradation.464 
This link again recalls the relationship between nuisance and 
commons governance.  The use of common pooled resources by one 
party unreasonably impairs the use of the same resource by others.  
 
 455 Id. 
 456 Id. at arts. 67-68. 
 457 Carissa Wong, Director Duty of Care in China and the United States: What 
Liability for Climate Change?, 18 VT. J. ENV’T. L. 287, 301-02 (2016). 
 458 Id. at 302-03. 
 459 Tort Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 451. 
 460 See Richard Zhang & Benoit Mayer, Public Interest Environmental Litigation 
in China, 1 CHI. J. ENVTL. L. 202 (2017) (discussing public interest environmental 
litigation in China). 
 461 Tort Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 451 at ch.II. 
 462 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 203. 
 463 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217. 
 464 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460,  at 217-18. 
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Both the 2010 Tort Law and the broader statutory framework of 
which it forms part appear aimed at righting this commons problem 
and provide a remedy and a means to gain access to justice for those 
negatively affected by over-exploitation.465 
The link between tort law and commons is the more pronounced 
in the Chinese setting.  The public interest portion of Chinese 
environmental protection litigation is rooted in a conception of an 
“ecological civilization.”466  This ecological civilization protects the 
commons by providing a “sound working and living 
environment.”467  This is a classical commons concern at the core of 
the American, French, and Russian conceptions of nuisance. 
Moreover, the Chinese conception also covers cultural 
commons.468  The environmental law framework is available in 
order to protect cultural relics against deterioration.469  This again 
creates a strong link between heritage, commons protection, and 
Chinese tort law in this broader setting. 
There are, however, notable differences between Chinese law 
and the other legal systems studied so far.  Most significantly, the 
other legal systems studied so far have located nuisance principles 
at the intersection between property and tort law.470  They have 
focused on the flipsides of use and interference through use through 
this lens of positive property rights to utilize one’s property and 
negative property rights to exclude others from interfering in one’s 
own property rights.471 
Chinese law does not locate the concern with commons 
protection at this intersection of property and tort law.  Rather, 
Chinese law places this concern at the intersection of tort and 
administrative law.472  This suggests a completely different 
theoretical approach to the problem of commons governance than 
nuisance law would suggest. 
 
 465 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460,  at 217-18. 
 466 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 209; Sun Qian & Jack Tuholske, An 
Exploration of and Reflection on China’s System of Environmental Public Interest 
Litigation, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10497, 10501-02 (2017). 
 467 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 209; see also Sun & Tuholske, supra note 
466. 
 468 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 218. 
 469 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 218. 
 470 See infra Sections I-III. 
 471 See infra Sections I-III. 
 472 See Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460. 
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This difference does not, however, undercut the core 
commonalities of a nuisance principle established so far.  Thus, the 
regime still places a premium on policing the use of shared resources 
(the environmental and cultural heritage).473  It does not approach 
the question of permissibility or impermissibility through the lens 
of fault.474  Even more starkly than the other approaches investigated 
so far, Chinese law looks to sustainability as the main goal post of 
commons governance. 475 
Perhaps most surprisingly, Chinese law in this broader legal 
infrastructure places governance of the commons in the hands of 
multiple actors.  It does not rely upon a regulatory approach.  
Rather, it relies upon a combination of private and governmental 
mechanisms to govern the commons.476  This combination consists 
of private rights to participation in the commons with public 
enforcement mechanisms for the protection of these rights.477  These 
public enforcement mechanisms, however, remain split between 
state-driven supervision through the administrative process and 
private enforcement through tort and public interest litigation. 
v. Israel 
Israel is a mixed jurisdiction, inhabiting a place between the civil 
and (English) common law.  The main instrument governing tort 
law in Israel, the Civil Wrongs Ordinance of 1944, is English in 
origin.478  The Civil Wrongs Ordinance “constitutes a sort of 
Restatement of the common law of torts, as it stood during the 1930’s 
and 1940’s.”479  This Ordinance, as updated, continues to provide the 
foundation for tort law in Israel.480 
 
 473 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217-18; Sun & Tuholske, supra note 466. 
 474 Wong, supra note 457. 
 475 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217-18; Sun & Tuholske, supra note 466. 
 476 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217-19. 
 477 Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217-19. 
 478 Aharon Barak, The Codification of the Civil Law and the Law of Torts, 24 ISR. L. 
REV. 628, 639 (1990). 
 479 Id. 
 480 Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 5712-1968, LSI 10 266 (Isr.), 
https://www.israelinsurancelaw.com/tort-ordinance-new-version-updated-to-
march-2015/ [https://perma.cc/WXX6-XVCZ].  In addition to the tort of nuisance, 
Israeli law also has a criminal nuisance statute.  This section deals with the private 
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The Civil Wrongs Ordinance contains a section on nuisance.  
Given its common law origin, it unsurprisingly distinguishes 
between public nuisance and private nuisance.  It codifies the law of 
public nuisance in sections 42 and 43.481  It codifies the law of private 
nuisance in sections 44 to 46.482  It defines a public nuisance as “some 
unlawful act, or omission to discharge a legal duty, where such act 
or omission endangers the life, safety, health, property or comfort of 
the public or obstructs the public in the exercise of some common 
right.”483  It requires an individual to have standing to bring an 
action of public nuisance.484 
The Civil Wrongs Ordinance defines private nuisance as 
conduct or use of immovable property so “as materially to interfere 
with the reasonable use and enjoyment, having regard to the 
situation and nature thereof, of the immovable property of any other 
person.”485  The Civil Wrongs Ordinance further codifies defenses, 
establishing that consent is a defense to nuisance whereas moving 
to the nuisance is not.486 
Like the other legal systems studied, Israeli law used private 
nuisance as a means to provide private redress for pollution.  One 
of the earliest cases using the nuisance section of the British-mandate 
Ordinance was Sick Fund of the General Federation of Jewish Labour in 
Palestine v. Taasiya Chemith.487  The case concerned the emission of 
gases from a chemical plant.488  These emissions ended up in a 
hospital, causing dizziness and headaches in its patients.489  The Tel 
Aviv District Court found that the emission constituted a 
nuisance.490 
 
law statute.  For a discussion on the relationship between the two, see Rachelle 
Adam, Government Failure and Public Indifference: A Portrait of Water Pollution in 
Israel, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 257, 311-12 (2000). 
 481 Tort Ordinance, 5712-1968, §§ 42-43 LSI 10 266 (Mar. 2015) (as amended) 
(Isr.), https://www.israelinsurancelaw.com/tort-ordinance-new-version-
updated-to-march-2015/ [https://perma.cc/WXX6-XVCZ]. 
 482 Id. at §§ 44-46. 
 483 Id. at § 42. 
 484 Id. at § 43. 
 485 Id. at § 44(a). 
 486 Id. at §§ 45-46. 
 487 Zeev Negbi, The Prevention of Nuisances in Israel, 11 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 822, 
826 (1962). 
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The perhaps paradigmatic cases for such a use of private 
nuisance in Israeli jurisprudence is Ata Textile Co. Ltd. v. Schwartz.491  
The case involved an aggrieved homeowner, Mr. Schwartz. 492  Mr. 
Schwartz lived on the edge of a residentially zoned area abutting an 
industrial area.493  Mr. Schwartz had the misfortune to have Israel’s 
largest textile factory belonging to Ata Textile Co. Ltd. for a 
neighbor.494  Ata had installed cooling equipment essential to its 
production methods in its factory.495  Unfortunately, first for Mr. 
Schwartz and then for Ata, the equipment “caused tremendous 
noise in Mr. Schwartz’s home.”496  Mr. Schwartz took Ata to court 
and sought an injunction to make it stop.497  
The case is paradigmatic for nuisance law because it allowed for 
the issuance of an injunction enjoining the nuisance even though the 
hardship of the injunction to the defendant was greater than the 
harm of the original nuisance to the plaintiff.  In other words, 
nuisance law is not only a means to receive compensation.498  It 
creates a positive duty to cease and desist from creating a nuisance. 
The case is interesting in another regard.  There is no sense in 
which Ata’s conduct could have been culpable or even negligent.  
Ata did not install the equipment in order to harm Mr. Schwartz.499  
Ata installed cooling equipment that was appropriate for its own 
purposes and apparently did so in a manner consistent with 
industry standards, or at the very least in a manner that would have 
satisfied an economic analysis of relative benefits and harms.500  Mr. 
Schwartz’s expectation of quiet was a reasonable use and enjoyment 
of his house,501  and the level of noise generated by Ata’s cooling 
 
 491 CivA 44/76 Ata Textile Company Ltd. v. Schwartz, 30(iii) P.D. 785 (1976) 
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equipment substantially interfered with it.502  The case therefore 
illustrates that the understanding in Israeli law of a substantial 
interference with reasonable use and enjoyment is consistent with 
the civil law understanding of neighbor’s rights or the actio negatoria:  
it operates without fault but with regard to the reasonableness of use 
seen from the perspective of the commons.503 
Both features of nuisance law are consistent with the function of 
nuisance laws outlined above to protect the commons against over-
use and interference with correlative rights.  In Schwartz, this 
common resource was the quiet enjoyment of a residential 
environment, pun intended.504  Any student who was unexpectedly 
exposed to noise while studying for a law school exam can 
personally confirm that quiet is a resource.  The problem is, as the 
same student may also painfully recall, it is a common pooled 
resource.  A room is only quiet when all are silent.  It was to protect 
this common pooled resource of “quiet” that the court issued an 
injunction—even though the injunction was not economically 
advantageous.  That is to say, the Court protected the commons 
from tragedy by allowing Mr. Schwartz to prevent the “over-use” of 
the noise threshold in the neighborhood through a nuisance 
action.505 
One should not misunderstand the result in Schwartz as an 
absolute injunction against use of commons whenever such use 
interferes with interest of a neighbor.  To the contrary, the Israeli 
Supreme Court in the earlier decision in Azari v. Victor Klein 
explained that the test is one of mutuality, reciprocity, and 
reasonableness.506  In terms of the commons, each member of the 
relevant community of interests has correlative rights to reasonable 
access to the commons.  Any insistence by one member of the 
community that would render the commons useless to the others 
would in Israeli terms be unreasonable and lacking in mutuality.507  
In French civil law terms, it would amount to an abuse of right.508  In 
 
 502 Perry, supra note 498, at 88-89. 
 503 See infra Sections V(b)(ii)-(iii); see also Civil Wrongs Ordinance, supra note 
481, at § 44(a).  See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Do the Right Thing: Indirect 
Remedies in Private Law, 94 BOS. U. L. REV. 55, 93 n.199 (2014) (discussing that 
nuisance is between strict and fault-based liability). 
 504 See Kretzmer, supra note 492, at 304-05. 
 505 Perry, supra note 498, at 109-10. 
 506 See Negbi, supra note 487, at 828. 
 507 See Negbi, supra note 487, at 828. 
 508 See infra Section V(b)(ii). 
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short, the nuisance principle is one that applies to the use of 
commons in context and in the interaction between its users and 
thus takes into account the plurality of interests and uses involved.  
This feature of nuisance therefore leaves a significant autonomy 
with the users of the commons.  Mutuality and reciprocity are 
concepts that assume communication and an attempt at reasonable 
self-regulation of the commons.509  The law of nuisance super-
imposes oversight over these self-regulatory processes to secure 
both the enforceability of reasonable reliance interests of 
participants and an appropriate incentive structure to avoid 
recourse to the courts as a means of last resort—a recourse that 
might end in an all-or-nothing injunction ex post rather than 
accommodation between the parties as to how use might be 
curtailed in a reasonable manner.  
Despite some practical divergence of public nuisance law in 
Israel,510 the key principle of nuisance in Israeli law largely tracks 
the principle of nuisance law and correlative rights as it has been 
developed on the basis of American, French, Russian, and Chinese 
law.  Israeli law confirms the purpose of nuisance law to protect 
commons by focusing on the relative uses of the commons.  
Nuisance law protects the commons while leaving significant 
flexibility to the users of the commons to determine their own rules 
for access and use of the commons.  It thus does not impose an 
absolute or hard rule of nuisance, but rather looks to a principle of 
nuisance to support the development of an equilibrium by and 
between commons users.  
vi. Shari’a 
Shari’a similarly richly incorporates the principle of protecting 
the commons.  The relationship between humans and creation is one 
cornerstone for protecting the commons.  Shari’a places humans in a 
position of stewardship.511  This stewardship entails the obligation 
 
 509 See Negbi, supra note 487, at 828; ELINOR OSTROM, THE FUTURE OF THE 
COMMONS 79-80 (2012) (discussing the importance of asking questions and building 
trust and growing social capital by doing so). 
 510 See Orit Marom-Albeck & Alon Tal, Upgrading Citizen Suits as a Tool for 
Environmental Enforcement in Israel: A Comparative Evaluation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 373, 400-
401 (2000). 
 511 Ali Ahmad, Islamic Water Law as an Antidote for Maintaining Water Quality, 
2 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 169, 178-9 (1999). 
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to protect and care for the environment, in other words, creation.512  
In principle, this obligation is not focused exclusively on human 
flourishing.513  It extends to the protection of nature as a whole in its 
own right.514  
This obligation is put expressly in terms of the commons.  As one 
scholar puts it, “misuse might result in unjustly depriving future 
generations of the ability to benefit from them, and thus would also 
contradict the teachings of the True Faith and the stewardship of 
Man on Earth.”515  This rationale tracks closely the rationale of the 
tragedy of the commons to enjoin overuse so as to prevent the 
collapse of the commons.516  
Shari’a fully internalizes this rationale.  In a metaphor that is 
meaningful for current purposes, “[i]n the Islamic perspective, 
people in a community can be compared to passengers on a ship.”517  
This life imposes “a common responsibility”518—and thus creates 
correlative rights.  This responsibility means that “[e]ach passenger 
has to ensure the ship’s safeguard not only for his own safety but 
that of others as well.”519  To disrupt the environment consequently 
“contradicts the principle that one should not cause environmental 
harm (embodied in Islamic Law (Shari’a)).”520  This principle again 
is broader than maintaining natural resource for future, human 
exploitation:  “[e]xcessive exploitation of the environment driven by 
insatiable consumerism, individual economic gain, or limitless 
development, is hardly consistent with the trusteeship of 
humankind over all other matters.”521  
This principle is further expressed in a manner reasonably close 
to the French concept of neighbor’s rights discussed above.522  The 
Quran requires that one do good to “the near neighbor[s], the 
 
 512 Omar A. Bakhashab, Islamic Law and the Environment: Some Basic Principles, 
3 ARAB L.Q. 287, 287-8 (1998). 
 513 Ahmad, supra note 511, at 178. 
 514 Ahmad, supra note 511, at 178. 
 515 Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 289. 
 516 See Hardin, supra note 215, at 1244-45. 
 517 Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 289. 
 518 Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 289. 
 519 Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 289. 
 520 Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 290. 
 521 Ahmad, supra note 511, at 179. 
 522 See infra Section V(b)(ii). 
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neighbor farther away.”523  This duty forms part of Shari’a.524  This 
principle is close in expression to the requirement to act with due 
regard for one’s neighbor and neighborhood usage underlying 
French neighbor’s rights.525  If anything, Shari’a extends this 
obligation further than French law because it covers neighbors near 
and far.526  Further, it requires more expressly that the conduct of 
one not destroy the rights of use of another even if such use were 
otherwise consistent with community practice.527  
This principle of Shari’a found expression in a manner very close 
to contemporary understandings of nuisance in the Medjellè, the 
Ottoman civil code.  The Medjellè “prohibited [the] serious 
hinderance [sic] of those living in neighboring buildings, inter alia, 
byexcessive [sic] smoke or odour from a furnace or manufactory of 
linseed.”528  
In the land use context, too, Shari’a remains largely consistent 
with the understanding of nuisance developed above.  In this 
context, too, “a person may undertake any kind of activity on his 
land to the extent that he does not degrade it or expose any beings, 
human or non-human, to danger.”529  Land use is circumscribed by 
obligations to warn and obligations to pay damages for lawfully 
conducted ultra-hazardous activities.530  But again, these activities 
must be conducted in the context of neighbor’s rights as outlined, 
for example, in the Medjellè.531  
This obligation grows more stringent the more essential the 
commons affected by human conduct.  For example, the obligation 
 
 523 Quran, Surah Ah-Nisa 4:36, QURAN.COM, 
https://quran.com/4/36?translations=27,22,21,20,95,19,18,17,101,34 
[https://perma.cc/YP6D-UKF5] (last visited Mar. 4, 2021). 
 524 Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 290. 
 525 Compare Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 290 (requiring one to take regard for 
one’s neighbors), with CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167 (requiring as a 
matter of French law that activities not be unduly impairing the enjoyment of one’s 
neighbor’s rights). 
 526 Quran, supra note 523. 
 527 Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 289. 
 528 MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS, TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION: 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CO-OPERATION OF STATES vii (Cees Flinterman 
et al. eds., 1986). 
 529 Ahmad, supra note 511, at 180. 
 530 Umar F. Moghul & Samir H.K. Safar-Aly, Green Sukuk: The Introduction of 
Islam’s Environmental Ethics to Contemporary Islamic Finance, 27 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. 
REV. 1, 15-16 (2014). 
 531 See TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION, supra note 514. 
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“is more pronounced in the case of water.”532  The justification for 
this heightened standard is expressly commons-based—water is 
different because it “is a resource held in common by society.”533  
This common ownership, and community right to water use, was 
also codified in the Ottoman Medjellè.534  
Interestingly, the shari’a approach, too, rejects absolutism.  
Centrally, Islamic “[j]urists endeavored to balance strong individual 
rights against collective community rights including non-human 
components of nature, and to remain within the parameters of the 
intent and objectives of The Lawgiver.”535  It thus embeds the 
concept of nuisance in the relationships between users of commons 
and the commons itself.  This again demonstrates a contextual 
approach, taking into account the autonomy of different actors in 
shaping how environmental nuisance principles are actually 
applied and the manner in which correlative rights are protected.  
c. Applying Nuisance to the Cyber Context 
The nuisance principle developed in the previous section 
functions to protect the rights of all participants in a commons 
against substantial interference with their enjoyment of the 
commons.  It does so by treating the participants in the commons as 
correlative rights holders.  These correlative rights secure that all 
participants in a commons maintain the commons and that none 
substantially interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of the 
commons by others.  As such, nuisance promises to be a principle 
that can guide legal decision making in the cyber context.  This 
section outlines how cyber nuisance would improve upon the blind 
spots in Tallinn 2.0 addressed above in key respects.  
 
 532 Ahmad, supra note 511, at 180. 
 533 Ahmad, supra note 511, at 180. 
 534 Moghul & Safar-Aly, supra note 530, at 16. 
 535 Moghul & Safar-Aly, supra note 530, at 14. 
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i. Debugging the Fault Trap 
One of the key problems bedeviling Tallinn 2.0 was its insistence 
upon fault.536  Tallinn 2.0 follows a responsibility paradigm.537  Thus, 
logically, it must also follow a full-blown fault paradigm.  This led 
to significant governance issues, particularly as a fault paradigm did 
not provide for any realistic means to improve governance.  
Cyber-nuisance changes the equation.  It treats cyber as a 
commons.  It therefore treats all participants in cyber as holding 
correlative rights to cyberspace.538  These correlative rights require 
the maintenance of the resource as to which multiple parties hold 
correlative rights, which in the case of the current inquiry is 
cyberspace.539  At times, this means one will need to help defray the 
costs of additional efforts by others to maintain the commons.540  
Consistent with climate finance approaches to the climate commons, 
it thus provides a means of cyber-finance to stand alongside cyber-
nuisance.541  That is, cyber nuisance does not leave actors unable to 
shoulder the financial burden of upkeep out on their own.  
Correlative rights further require that one not use cyberspace in 
a manner that is fundamentally inconsistent with its use and 
enjoyment by others.  Hacks, malware, and similar intrusions are 
inherently suspect—such intrusions typically interfere with the 
privacy rights of participants and, as such, are internationally 
unlawful in their own right.542  Cyber-nuisance adds an additional 
layer of protection by requiring correlative rights holders to 
diligently prevent conditions making such hacking more likely.  
But the dissemination of content, too, can create a nuisance.  
Cyberbullying and cyberstalking are illustrative examples of 
conduct that can—in the right circumstances—be akin to the 
 
 536 See infra Section I. 
 537 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 84 r. 14. 
 538 Pierce, supra note 36 (discussing the concept of correlative rights in relation 
to property in oil and gas and in other contemporary issues). 
 539 Pierce, supra note 36. 
 540 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). 
 541 See generally ALEXANDER ZAHAR, CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017) (analyzing climate finance obligations of developed and 
developing countries). 
 542 See generally Sourgens, Privacy, supra note 290 (delineating a balancing test 
between reasonable expectations of privacy and the proportionality of the means 
used to intrude). 
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creation of, say, noise nuisances.543  This means that cyber-nuisance 
does require policing of content beyond prohibiting intrusions 
through hacks.  
Importantly, cyber-nuisance does not grant any cyber 
participant a veto right over others any more than nuisance gives 
people a veto right over their neighbor’s conduct at home.  If the 
point of cyber is connectivity, then there is a right to connect and 
exchange.  This right entails that others may say things we find 
deeply offensive.544  By analogy, cyber-nuisance addresses this 
concern by requiring a balancing of the respective rights of each 
participant.545  It errs on the side of expression and only enjoins the 
substantial interference with the rights of others to use cyberspace 
that is, the balance must substantially favor intervention.546  
In many instances, conduct is clearly a nuisance, and as such, 
requires abatement.  The dissemination of revenge pornography is 
 
 543 See Melissa Anne Springer, Warning! Speak at Your Own Risk: First 
Amendment Restrictions on Off-Campus Physical, Emotional, or Cyberbullying, 86 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (2018) (categorizing cyber conduct as a nuisance in ordinary 
language terms); Maureen E. Brady, Property and Projection, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 
1194-95 (2020) (discussing projecting images as nuisance when done with malicious 
intent and substantially interfering with the property right).  Social media accounts 
are property.  In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015).  As such, they 
are meaningfully analogous in important respects to the facades at issue in 
Professor Brady’s article.  This means that the ordinary language use of “nuisance” 
in the cyber context is in fact on to something.  Cyber-bullying on social media 
accounts is an interference with a property interest.  To the extent that it is 
substantial and unreasonable—and in fact malicious, per Professor Brady’s 
discussion—the notion that it constitutes a nuisance is no longer far-fetched. 
 544 In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359, 371 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015) (discussing the 
importance of connectivity and visibility in categorizing social media accounts as 
property); see also Brady, supra note 542, at 1202-13 (discussing the First Amendment 
implications of projections torts cases). 
 545 See Springer, supra note 542, at 863; Brady, supra note 543, at 1202-13 
(discussing the First Amendment implications of projections torts cases).  The 
argument here is one of analogy. 
 546 Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 605 (Tex. 2016).  
The Crosstex case concerns interference with land.  As discussed above in footnote 
542, the substantial interference with a property interest is reasonably analogous to 
the substantial interference with a property interest in land.  Particularly, the 
projection of images onto a house or business is in fact reasonably analogous to 
projecting on to a social media page in that it seeks to tag the person or business in 
a highly visible and identifiable manner.  It is therefore reasonable to extend the 
nuisance logic here as well once the nature of social media as property takes further 
hold.  I will develop this thought further in a future article. 
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one such instance.547  Similarly, it is almost inherent in the name that 
the use of “troll farms” to amplify misinformation campaigns is a 
nuisance.548  Troll farms amplify online noise to harm their target in 
the same way as the installation of industrial equipment in a 
residential neighborhood would.  But the pendulum similarly 
swings in the other direction when it comes to the right of 
individuals to engage in conspiratorial discourse—even to trade in 
misinformation to make a political point.  Free expression on the 
internet defies a truth police.  
This shift away from a responsibility or fault paradigm has 
consequences for remedies, as well.  The only listed potential self-
help remedy for a nuisance is abatement.  Self-help logically is 
similarly limited to the abatement logic.549  The appropriate 
countermeasures (that is, self-help in the international context) for 
the failure of a State to respect correlative rights is also abatement.  
It is not a general countermeasure.  It is a countermeasure that itself 
conserves the commons.  
How then would cyber-nuisance treat the problems identified in 
Section II differently?  The legal risk assessment of countering a 
potential outbreak of Emotet in Frankfurt illustrates the fault trap of 
Tallinn 2.0.550  Tallinn 2.0 created a negative incentive against 
preventing an outbreak.551  
Cyber-nuisance creates the opposite incentive.  First, correlative 
right holders have an overriding obligation to maintain the 
commons to the best of their ability.  This includes an obligation to 
take reasonable preventive measures to render safe their portion of 
 
 547 See generally Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First 
Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661 (2016) (discussing freedom of expression 
and revenge pornography balancing in the First Amendment context). 
 548 See generally Aja Romano, Twitter released 9 million tweets from one Russian 
troll farm. Here’s what we learned, VOX (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/10/19/17990946/twitter-russian-trolls-bots-
election-tampering [https://perma.cc/GV43-PR3E] (reporting about the fake 
tweets created by a trollfarm in Russia during the 2016 U.S. election). 
 549 See Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 610 ("It is well-settled that three different 
remedies are potentially available to a claimant who prevails on a private-nuisance 
claim: damages, injunctive relief, and self-help abatement”). 
 550 See Cimpanu, supra note 207. 
 551 See infra Section III(c). 
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the commons.552  The starting position therefore is different as 
Tallinn 2.0 did not include such an obligation of prevention.553  
Taking preventive measures in the cyber-nuisance context also 
helps to govern up.  As discussed in the previous section, the 
nuisance principle is governed largely by neighborhood standards.  
Obligations are mutual.554  This means that to benefit from greater 
efforts by others to maintain the commons, one therefore would be 
well-advised to lead by example and improve the commons.  Such 
leading by example will not inure to one’s detriment as one only is 
obligated to act as the neighborhood acts.  Thus, if others fail to 
follow the lead, one should remain free to step back without falling 
below the threshold of neighborhood standards.555  But if one 
succeeds, one benefits from the significantly increased cyber 
commons in much the same way as commons participants do in the 
water context—the improvement is exponential.  
Cyber-nuisance thus lends itself to trust building.  It allows 
neighbors to step up their respective efforts to improve the 
neighborhood.  This effort creates a visible lift for others to follow 
suit.  As a neighborhood principle, it further provides a greater 
incentive for networks to form in order to create better means to 
protect cyber and monitor and communicate about these efforts.  
ii. The Attribution Shield 
Cyber nuisance also helps to avoid the problems posed by the 
attribution for Tallinn 2.0.  Briefly, the attribution problem meant 
that one had to prove that conduct in fact was perpetrated by an 
organ of state or that the state in fact had effective control over a 
cyber-operation.556  This led to practical problems of proof that could 
easily become insurmountable.557  
Cyber-nuisance shields from the attribution problem.  It imposes 
an obligation on the State not to interfere substantially with the quiet 
 
 552 Derosne v. Puzin, D.P. [1845] I. 13, 14-15 (Fr.); see Zile, supra note 380, at 
294-98 (translating and analyzing the relevant positions of the Derosne v. Puzin in 
English.). 
 553 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 43-44 r. 7 ¶¶ 7-8. 
 554 See Negbi, supra note 487, at 828. 
 555 CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167. 
 556 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 87, 94 rr. 15 & 17. 
 557 See infra Section II. 
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enjoyment of others.  The threshold for this obligation is lower than 
the attribution threshold for conduct the State supports, whether 
directly or indirectly.  Further, this obligation also entails an 
obligation to harden infrastructure so as to make it more difficult for 
third parties to use State capabilities to further a cyber-operation by 
third parties.  
The first problem concerned attributing the hack of South 
Korean banks as well as Sony to North Korea.  As discussed above, 
it is not entirely clear whether the initial identification of North 
Korea as the culprit in these attacks was premised upon sufficient 
evidence.558  A cyber-nuisance paradigm would sidestep this 
problem.  It would instead require efforts by North Korea to avoid 
incursion into its cyber network.  Notably, North Korea would not 
have to achieve this end alone.  Rather, those interested in requiring 
North Korea to avoid future abuse of its cyber infrastructure under 
a cyber-nuisance approach may well be asked to help pay for the 
upgrade.559  But to the extent that North Korea’s infrastructure is 
below the threshold of other similarly situated actors, cyber 
nuisance can require that its infrastructure be further improved.  
The second problem discussed above concerned “patriotic 
hackers.”560  Patriotic hackers presented a problem for Tallinn 2.0 as 
they are not state organs and are not under the effective control of 
the State.  Cyber nuisance would impose multiple obligations on the 
State, each of which would likely make patriotic hackers a less 
palatable scenario for cyber operations.  
First, the State could very well be made liable for “arming” or 
supporting patriotic hackers.  It is reasonably clear even under an 
intentional nuisance view that the kind of support given to such 
 
 558 Brian Todd & Ben Brumfield, supra note 173. 
 559 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).  
The Spur Industries case is one of the leading cases for this type of remedial approach 
in U.S. law.  See Osborne M. Reynolds Jr., Of Time and Feedlots: The Effect of Spur 
Industries on Nuisance Law, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 75 (1992).  This 
remedial logic applies by analogy to the international setting if we follow a nuisance 
logic.  In the international setting, such an approach is already in ascendency in the 
context of another area of law that is frequently associated with commons 
governance—namely, climate in the context of climate finance obligations to 
support carbon mitigation efforts by developing countries.  See ZAHAR, supra note 
541 (discussing climate finance); Scott J. Shackelford, The Future of Frontiers, 23 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1331, 1372-74 (2020) (discussing climate change and cyber 
from a commons governance perspective); Frederic G. Sourgens, A Parisian 
Consensus, 60 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming, 2021) (discussing climate 
change from an energy commons governance perspective). 
 560 Calamur, supra note 185. 
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groups would make it materially likely that harm will befall 
somebody whom the patriotic hacker believes to represent a threat 
to the fatherland.561  To support such persons in their endeavors 
therefore would not be consistent with the cyber nuisance paradigm.  
Second, if the State is made responsible for the interference with 
the rights of third parties by actors it cannot effectively control, it is 
all the more likely that the State will wish to bring such capabilities 
in house.  Such a move would be prudent if only to have greater 
operational control.  And control now is no longer a hallmark for 
fault trigger.  
At the same time, the standard remains heavily contextual.  A 
State therefore only has cause to complain about the conduct of 
another if it is not itself engaged in the same kind of activity.  The 
more espionage and other activities States conduct, the less credible 
a claim for cyber-nuisance by such a State becomes.  Given the cyber 
operations loosely said to be affiliated with most (even regional) 
powers, cyber-nuisance would require mutual cyber disarmament 
before any claim would lie for violation of one’s correlative rights.  
An abuser of rights cannot complain of abuse of rights.  
The attribution shield is the first step in removing an obstacle to 
good commons governance.  This obstacle is the incentive structure 
of a hierarchically privileged State able to provide rewards to those 
unaffiliated with it to achieve certain goals no matter the collateral 
damage.562  This incentive structure is indicative of failed commons 
governance mechanisms and is a kind of polycentricity of decay.563  
It erodes trust and creates incentives to emulate destructive 
behaviors.  And yet, the erosion of trust is diffuse and networked 
between realpolitik-driven State actors and their collaborators.  
Removing this shield is therefore instrumental in securing a long-
term sustainable governance process.  
 
 561 Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 605 (Tex. 2016).  
Again, the reference to Crosstex is intended by analogy as Crosstex is a sophisticated 
articulation of nuisance law principles – principles which this Article has argued in 
fact enjoy the status of a general principle of law.  The logic of that principle 
therefore should be applicable – by analogy – in the international setting.  
 562 See generally OSTROM, supra note 32, at 157-73 (illustrating irrigation 
development projects in Sri Lanka). 
 563 See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 157-73. 
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iii. Polycentric Connectivity 
The final problem for Tallinn 2.0 highlighted in the first section 
was its State-centered approach and the loss of core non-State 
stakeholders in cyber governance.  Tallinn 2.0 is adamant that it 
applies only to State conduct.564  It further did not provide a 
seamless, nestled governance structure by allowing States to not 
preventively regulate, to not harden their cyber infrastructure, and 
to not monitor cyber conduct in their respective jurisdictions.565 
Cyber-nuisance changes this approach to cyber-governance 
radically.  Cyber-nuisance requires States to respect the correlative 
rights of all participants in cyberspace.  Cyber-nuisance takes States 
to task to use their regulatory power to bring about this result and 
thus imposes a regulatory obligation on the State preventively to 
regulate, harden cyber infrastructure, and monitor cyber conduct in 
a manner consistent with the overall neighborhood standards in the 
relevant portion of cyberspace. 
Furthermore, cyber-nuisance takes into account the input from 
non-State actors as very real parts of the obligations involved.  The 
cyber neighborhood is not just the State-owned infrastructure.  It 
includes cyberspace as a whole.  The standard of conduct of private 
actors in cyber therefore are an integral part of setting neighborhood 
expectations.  Thus, if the private actors in cyber collectively raise 
the standard of cyber protection, the State would in principle be 
required to follow suit under a nuisance logic.  The far more likely 
outcome, however, is that these actors will interconnect and 
exchange on governance and thus share in respective governance 
responsibilities under a cyber-nuisance paradigm. 
Moreover, the discussion above on regulating cyber speech 
already suggests that the appropriate balancing will not depend 
upon state actors alone.  If posts on Twitter or Facebook constituted 
a cyber-nuisance, it would require Twitter or Facebook to assist in 
regulating this conduct, for instance, by taking down the posts.566  
Twitter and Facebook presumably will respond to regulatory 
 
 564 TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17 r. 4. 
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pressures to do so.  They will also respond to market pressures to do 
so.567  But in the final analysis, the abatement of the nuisance—and 
the setting of the first line of standards to avoid nuisances—will lie 
with apex platforms. 
This point is sadly no longer exclusively academic.  Following 
the attack on the U.S. Capitol by supporters of then-President 
Trump on January 6, 2020, social media platforms such as Twitter 
did the previously unthinkable—they “de-platformed” the 
President of the United States; that is, they terminated his ability to 
post to the network.568  Other actors, such as Amazon, then cut off 
the ability of other platforms, like Parler, to operate.569  These 
actions—by private companies arguably in keeping with their 
respective terms of use—represent a very tangible attempt to abate 
a cyber-nuisance:  to shut off the use of cyberspace as a means to 
plan violent attacks on lawmakers and government institutions 
ahead of the inauguration of President Biden.570 
The cyber-nuisance perspective allows a different lens through 
which to assess the actions of social media platforms.  This lens 
would suggest that as long as there is a real threat, premised in 
actionable intelligence, that cyber platforms are indeed used to plot 
violence, the abatement logic suggests even such drastic action.  The 
fact that private actors do in fact take such action thus is consistent 
with a cyber-nuisance paradigm. 
At the same time, the cyber-nuisance paradigm suggests that 
there must be clear limits to such de-platforming.  Consider the 
military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021.  The New York Times 
reported that “[m]obile networks and the internet were 
intermittently down in major cities, and some local journalists went 
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into hiding for fear that their reporting could compromise their 
safety.”571  Similarly, one of the flashpoints in Hong Kong’s protests 
was the use of social media to “galvanize support during a political 
movement.”572  In fact, such social media posts led to arrests under 
Hong Kong’s new national security law as inciting secession.573  
Amnesty International has called out this conduct by the Chinese 
government as fundamentally inconsistent with the right to free 
expression, noting that “[i]nternational human rights laws do not 
allow states to restrict all peaceful expression in the name of national 
security.”574  This rationale obviously applies to arrests in the name 
of national security.575  But it should also extend to access to cyber 
connectivity and the ability to engage in peaceful expression in the 
first place. 
If such conduct by states is questionable because it limits 
freedom of expression and connectivity, cyber-nuisance suggests 
that it should similarly be problematic when it is perpetrated by 
private apex actors.  The correlative rights of cyber participants are 
impaired by both, state action and private action.  The cyber-
nuisance logic, therefore, requires some limitation on the power of 
apex platforms to shut out those with whom it disagrees. 
Here, the currently unfolding reaction to the January 6 Capitol 
riot will provide an early test case.576  The abatement strategy by 
apex platforms to deprive certain kind of speech of a platform can 
be justified.577  The Amnesty International critique of Chinese 
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crackdowns in the name of national security here is instructive:  is 
the speech in question “peaceful expression?”578  Incitement to 
violence certainly is not.579 
The actions of apex platforms become increasingly problematic 
if the platforms use their market power in the absence of such a 
threat of violence.  The Biden White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki 
bluntly stated that the Biden White House does not miss President 
Trump on Twitter.580  As that statement suggests, this inability is 
beginning to affect political discourse.  The line between policing 
dangerous content and peaceful expression therefore appears 
increasingly tenuous to hold. 
Cyber-nuisance would therefore counsel that de-platforming is 
an acceptable abatement only to a point.  Once actionable threats of 
violence have ceased, continuing to shut out cyber participants on 
the basis of the content of their speech is problematic.  In fact, de-
platforming might even give rise to a cyber-nuisance in its own right 
as it infringes on the correlative rights of a large number of peaceful 
actors.581  How apex platforms strike this balance at the current time, 
therefore, will be of particular importance to watch. 
Radical though this change is, it does not give up the function of 
cyber-nuisance as a principle of international law, that is, the law 
between States.  Cyber-nuisance as a principle of international law 
does not bind non-State actors as such.582  Rather, cyber-nuisance as 
a principle of international law requires States to communicate with 
non-State actors under their jurisdiction to regulate in a manner 
consistent with the correlative rights of other States and other non-
State cyber participants. 
But importantly, cyber-nuisance functions as more than just a 
principle of international law.  It also has a role to play in 
transnational and domestic law.  Thus, if the submission in this 
Article is right, non-State actors are themselves subject to cyber-
 
 578 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 573. 
 579 See Satariano, supra note 576. 
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nuisance concerns as a holder of correlative rights and correlative 
duties vis-à-vis other, similarly situated non-State actors.  These 
correlative rights and duties are part of the legal decision-making 
process of these non-State actors as part of their own governance 
environment. 
This means that cyber sets up nestled governance processes that 
all follow a similar logic of correlative rights as made actionable in 
the nuisance context.  States act in a regulatory and a sovereign 
capacity as actors in cyber in their own right as guided by the State-
based public international law cyber-nuisance principle.  Global 
business transactions concerning cyber infrastructure are governed 
by the transnational principle of cyber-nuisance as incorporated in 
the lex digitalis.  And the relationship between consumers or users of 
cyber and private companies in turn is governed by correlative 
rights principles as established in their domestic laws. 
Each of these cyber-nuisance processes sits nestled in the other 
as each can affect the other.583  An increase in cyber-diligence in the 
transnational space will affect neighborhood conditions in the 
international setting.  International diligence obligations will change 
the domestic regulatory space.  The domestic regulatory space will 
affect the transnational space and so on.  Governance is thus truly 
polycentric.  Cyber-nuisance can bring all stakeholders to the table 
to govern up. 
This leaves the question of how a cyber-nuisance paradigm 
would look at NotPetya.584  We already have the lion share of the 
answer to this problem.  To begin with, a cyber-nuisance paradigm 
would flag that many actors failed to do their part to protect the 
commons and thus, the correlative rights of other participants.  The 
development of EternalBlue by the NSA would raise a flag as the 
program foreseeably could have been used to wreak precisely the 
havoc that it did.585  The hack of EternalBlue and its dissemination 
also would raise additional cyber-nuisance concerns.586  Leaving 
aside the legality of the deployment of NotPetya in Ukraine itself, 
the willingness to do collateral damage globally would be a further 
concern.587  Finally, business would have a role to play—Windows 
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in dealing with a vulnerability and global business in protecting 
critical infrastructure from cross-company contamination.588 
In the case of NotPetya, cyber-nuisance would not be a good tool 
to assign blame.  Given the chain reaction needed to lead to 
NotPetya, cyber-nuisance would be of reasonably little help in a 
liability context.  Maersk and consequently Denmark would have a 
right to act against the Russian Federation if the NotPetya attack 
could be attributed to the Russian Federation.  But they likely would 
have had such a right under Tallinn 2.0, in any event.589  The more 
interesting question is whether Maersk and consequently Denmark 
would have rights against the United States and Ukraine—rights 
they would not have under Tallinn 2.0.590  While cyber-nuisance 
provides a plausible articulation of how the United States and 
Ukraine created conditions causing Maersk a substantial 
impairment of its correlative rights in cyber, it is far from clear 
whether such arguments would clear the hurdles of causation and 
overcome Maersk’s own conduct and the relative reasons by the 
United States and Ukraine, for their respective actions and 
omissions would not ultimately speak against imposing liability on 
a cyber-nuisance theory. 
But the point of cyber-nuisance is precisely not to assign blame 
but to assist in future decision-making.591  And here, cyber-nuisance 
is both far more robust and far more consistent with the actual 
regulatory response to NotPetya.  It turns out that the United States 
and its Department of Homeland Security has stepped up its 
regulatory dialogue businesses to prevent similar vulnerabilities by 
issuing guidelines and discussing their implementation with 
businesses.592  Companies on their own are acting to harden their 
own cyber defenses.593  In other words, actors are responding as 
prudent correlative rights holders both to protect themselves and 
the commons.  Such collaborative action between States and 
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businesses increases neighborhood standards.  This increase in 
neighborhood standards in turn lays the predicate for future 
appraisal of new threat scenarios—and it is perfectly consistent with 
the decision by City of Frankfurt to shut down its IT department in 
the face of an Emotet threat to avoid a cross-contamination.594 
In other words, many actors are already engaging each other in 
cyber in a manner that is consistent with the concept of correlative 
rights and nuisance as developed in this Article.  Cyber-nuisance 
would provide a better rubric through which to understand this 
conduct and guide it more quickly towards a better maintained, 
more diffusively governed cyber commons. 
The SolarWinds hack showcases why accelerating this process is 
so important.  SolarWinds has shown us both the promise and peril 
of a cyberspace that is fundamentally co-operated by public and 
private entities.  On the side of peril, it was the lax security at a 
globally operating apex cyber company that permitted the 
spectacular hack to come off in the first place.595  It was the strategic 
importance of this company to governmental infrastructure that 
allowed the hack to elude early detection—and “exploit[] seams in 
U.S. defenses.”596  Public and private cybersecurity, therefore, are 
fused at the hip and must be treated as such to protect the commons. 
But just as importantly—and here is the promise of the current 
paradigm—it was a private company and not the government that 
discovered the intrusion and began the process of analyzing the 
breach.597  The fact that actors collaborate across the public/private 
divide to secure the commons therefore is instrumental to hardening 
cyber-defenses and securing greater access to the promise of cyber.  
It is only when such cooperation intensifies that rogue actors (be 
they state controlled, commercial, criminal, or in the grey between) 
can be found out and the consequences of their conduct abated.  In 
other words, while there is a path, there is a long way yet to travel. 
VI. CONCLUSION:  CYBER-NUISANCE AND CYBER-GOVERNANCE 
What are the consequences of cyber-nuisance for cyber-
governance?  Cyber-nuisance has made several significant 
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contributions to cyber governance.  The first of these contributions, 
while it may appear reasonably minor, is paradigm-shifting.  Tallinn 
2.0 rejected to treat cyber as a commons on the grounds that cyber is 
subject to the jurisdiction of States and as such not communally 
owned.598  The Article has shown that this is a significant 
misunderstanding of commons and commons governance and 
should lead the Tallinn 2.0 experts to rethink their conclusion. 
Centrally, Tallinn 2.0 starts out from the principles of sovereignty 
that each State shall be absolutely free to enjoy its own rights within 
its sovereign jurisdiction and that each State may not unreasonably 
interfere with the rights of States in their respective jurisdictions.599  
This articulation of the starting point in Tallinn 2.0 is close to a 
textbook Roman law understanding of property.600  It also mirrors 
the understanding of otherwise apparently absolute property rights 
in the common law.601 
What this Article has shown is that commons form when these 
absolute rights interact with each other to exploit a common pooled 
resource and create correlative rights for its participants.  In the 
Roman law, this understanding gave rise to the actio negatoria.602  At 
common law, it gave rise to the action of nuisance and later to a fully 
fleshed understanding of correlative rights the protection of which 
remains actionable in nuisance.603 
The point that can hardly be overstressed is this:  oil and gas 
lessees have a property right in fee simple determinable in the 
mineral estate.604  This right is in fee.605  This is similar to the 
sovereign concern in Tallinn 2.0.606  The fact that oil and gas lessees 
producing from a common formation are nevertheless acting in a 
commons and are correlative rights holder in that commons should 
put to the rest the notion that absolute ownership of a part defeats 
the existence of a commons in a whole or correlative rights against 
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other commons participants.607  And this is not a quirk of American 
property law.  It is the received wisdom of Justinian.608  Moreover, it 
is consistent with legal traditions as diverse as shari’a, the mixed 
jurisdiction of Israel, and the People’s Republic of China.609 
This alone requires a fundamental rethinking of Tallinn 2.0.  It 
completely misses from view that commons create correlative 
rights.610  A legal decision-making toolkit operating in a commons 
that does not account for correlative rights is flawed and 
significantly under-protects the rights of participants in the 
commons.  Not only that, but it also threatens the very infrastructure 
Tallinn 2.0 seeks to protect.  As property (sovereignty) matters to 
Tallinn 2.0, so should the commons. 
Importantly, Tallinn 2.0 hints at the critical importance of such a 
commons understanding of cyber when it imports the core diligence 
norm from international environmental law.611  It just 
misunderstands it.  The diligence norm in international 
environmental law developed in jurisprudence from Trail Smelter 
onwards is a nuisance norm to protect U.S. communities against 
cross-boundary air pollution from Canadian smokestacks.612  It 
imports precisely the commons concerns Tallinn 2.0 rejects.613 
Tallinn 2.0, in other words, mistranslates the general 
international law it wishes to import into cyber.  Cyber-nuisance sets 
out how a more faithful translation would change the landscape of 
cyber governance in the mold of Tallinn 2.0.   Such a translation 
would allow for a more networked approach to cyber-security.  It 
further would provide a means to move away from a view of cyber 
as the new battlefield and towards an understanding of cyber as a 
space of correlative rights and cooperative collaboration. 
This focus on correlative rights can also banish the threat of 
spiraling countermeasures wreaking further destruction on cyber.  
The avowed reason to set a high threshold for diligence obligations 
was to avoid a scenario in which States impose ever harsher 
countermeasures on each other for a failure to keep their diligence 
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obligations.  This reason makes sense in a responsibility paradigm.  
It is out of place in a correlative right paradigm. 
Cyber-nuisance has shown that the appropriate remedy for the 
substantial impairment of correlative rights is abatement.614  Self-
help or countermeasures therefore in the first instance are also 
limited to actions in abatement, that is, actions that remove the 
specific cyber threat.615  This limitation already excludes the tit-for-
tat of spiraling countermeasures.616  To constitute permissible self-
help, the nuisance paradigm requires that each countermeasure be 
specifically tailored to abate the nuisance. 
This still leaves significant room for cyber operations, including 
offensive cyber operations.  A State that stands to suffer particular 
harm (in other words, would have standing to sue for a private 
nuisance) may take countermeasures to seek out and destroy cyber 
capabilities of States and non-State actors alike to the extent that 
those cyber capabilities demonstrably and substantially threaten its 
correlative rights to enjoy the cyber commons.   To do so, it must 
warn the relevant actors to give them an opportunity to abate the 
nuisance themselves, consistent with existing countermeasure 
principles.617  If the warning goes unheeded, the State could then act 
to protect the cyber infrastructure.618  But to act in such defense of 
the commons in logic would also require the State to forswear the 
development and deployment of similar capabilities to those being 
sought and destroyed.  Estoppel would require as much.619 
To the extent that such measures cannot be taken directly, 
indirect countermeasures may still be permissible in very limited 
circumstances.  Specifically, if any attempt at abatement would itself 
harm the cyber commons, this would preclude the use of those 
countermeasures.  Then, other measures may well be necessary to 
bring about abatement.  Even then, however, the logic of the regime 
set out in this Article suggests that any actions may not themselves 
create a cyber-nuisance.  And any such actions must be preceded by 
appropriate offers of assistance to abate the cyber nuisance 
proportionate to the countermeasures about to be undertaken to 
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comply with the requirement to warn as adapted to its new 
environment.620 
This remedial consequence of the cyber-nuisance paradigm 
allows one to have both greater diligence and less chaos from 
sprawling cyber countermeasures.621  It again makes States and 
other participants in cyber accountable to each other for the 
conservation of their commons.  At worst, the remedial consequence 
of excessive self-help would lead to excessive conservation.  This 
result is broadly consistent with the correlative rights rationale to 
put sustainability of use for all above the interests of use of each.622  
It is therefore not an unintended consequence or crude destabilizer 
of the commons. 
Finally, cyber-nuisance also begins to provide the clues to 
answer that has vexed the discussion from the other, private law 
side.  As discussed in the previous section, transnational lawyers 
previously insisted upon the existence of a transnational lex 
digitalis.623  This insistence upon a lex digitalis was premised upon the 
idea that cyberspace is beyond the jurisdiction of a States to 
regulate—that it is a communally owned space in needed of truly 
stateless regulation.624 
Cyber-nuisance has suggested that this insistence is just as 
wrong as the insistence by Tallinn 2.0 that cyber is not a commons.  
The lex digitalis went too far in completely unmooring cyber from 
the underlying jurisdictional ties that bind it to the brick-and-mortar 
world.  It turns out that it may have done so on the basis of the same 
misunderstanding as Tallinn 2.0, but in reverse, namely on the basis 
of the assumption that a commons must be a fully communally 
owned space.625  As the comparative property law analysis in this 
Article has shown, this premise is simply false.  Commons can exist 
between and across distinct and parceled out claims of ownership—
or in the sovereign context, jurisdiction.  What makes such commons 
interesting is that the relative ownership claims strengthen rather 
than weaken the correlative rights involved.  It provides a stronger 
anchor for the holding of correlative rights and thus provides a more 
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interesting conception of commons governance in a co-owned 
relationship between separately owned spaces. 
This understanding is likely to provide a more interesting 
intersect between the State-based world of Tallinn 2.0 and the 
stateless world of the lex digitalis.  Cyber-nuisance thus can function 
as a bridge between normative orders that can doubtless enrich each 
other through the understanding of the respective “other half” they 
currently miss. 
Cyber-nuisance finally reinvigorates the etymological pull of 
cyber.  The κυβερνάτας of a Greek vessel was its steersman or 
guide.626  Steering a vessel is not a question of land or open sea.  It 
requires both.  This was anchored in the very soul of the seafaring 
Athenian.  Just ask an Athenian about their founding myths and 
they would tell you their ancestors were sprung from the land of 
Attica itself, autochthones.627  The greatest seafarers of the ancient 
West—the greatest steersmen—were thus earthborn and seaborne 
alike.  Land and sea, land and commons, were no contradiction—
they were part of the same identity.  Cyber, and correlative rights in 
cyber, reflect the same experience 3,400 years hence. 
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